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FOREWORD
Transformation of our national security system to
meet the challenges of the 21st century has been the
focus of a number of prominent studies dating from
the end of the Cold War. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC)
has been an integral part of this critical national dialogue throughout. In November 2000, SSI published
Organizing for National Security, edited by Dr. Douglas Stuart of Dickinson College. In March 2008, SSI
co-sponsored a conference on “Reform and the Next
President’s Agenda” with the Project on National Security (PNSR) at the Bush School of Government and
Public Service at Texas A&M. This conference was followed by publication of Dr. Gabriel Marcella’s book,
Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security,
in December 2008. More recently, on April 22, 2010,
the Bush School of Government and Public Service
at Texas A&M University and SSI conducted a colloquium in Washington, DC, titled “2010: Preparing for
a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National
Security Reform in the Obama Administration.”
In order for institutional reform to succeed, it must
be guided by a coherent and compelling national security strategy anchored in widely-accepted national
interests. Shortly after this last conference, President
Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy was issued in May 2010, well after the publication of the
Department of Defense (DoD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in December 2009. The National Security
Strategy sought both to lay out our national interests in
a radically changed post-Cold War security environ-
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ment and to outline a series of organizational reforms
to oversee and execute the strategy.
Following a year of study after the publication of
the National Security Strategy, SSI hosted a workshop
chaired by Dr. Robin Dorff on the new National Security Staff in Washington, DC, on September 26, 2011.
Participants included former National Security Advisor General James Jones and former Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair, as well as a
number of well-known practitioners and theoreticians
in the field. The workshop focused on management
of our national security apparatus as a comprehensive
system at the strategic level with issue management
decentralized in the departments, agencies, and interagency teams. While there was broad agreement on
the need for strategic management of the national security system, there was little consensus as to where
that management function should reside.
Congressional interest in national security reform
began in 2007 at the behest of then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. Funding was
provided in 2008 and 2009 for an extraordinarily comprehensive study of the national security system that
was conducted by the Project on National Security
(PNSR). However, efforts to push national security
reform from study concepts and recommendations
to reality have, for the most part, been unsuccessful.
Sensing a lack of interest on the part of the Obama
administration, Congress responded with Section
1072 of the FY 2012 Defense Authorization Act with a
requirement for the President to respond to the Congress with a detailed organizational plan for implementing the National Security Strategy.
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While many of the organizational and system
changes proposed by various practitioners and studies could be implemented through Executive Order,
history indicates that these changes would probably
not endure across administrations. One need only
look at the PDD-56 reforms proposed by President
Bill Clinton in the mid-1990s or Executive Order 13434
(National Security Professional Development) issued
by President George W. Bush. Both were undercut by
vigorous opposition from the departments and agencies, and neither effort was tied to funding and additional personnel resources from Congress.
Enduring change and proper resourcing come
from legislation and congressional mandates such as
the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Section 1072 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act offers a strategic opportunity for the
Congress and the executive branch to come together
to design and organize a national security system for
the 21st century.
The National Security Act of 1947 was designed to
overcome problems encountered during World War
II. Enactment of this foundational legislation required
a reorganization of congress, accomplished in 1946.
Section 1072 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act offers an historic opportunity to “fix the
future.” A good place to start is at the top of our national security system—the National Security Staff.
This monograph provides an organizational concept
for strategic management by the National Security
Staff of our national security system that would be
underwritten by congressional oversight and funding.
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SSI is pleased to publish this monograph, believings that the individual research, analysis, and
recommendations expressed within will contribute
importantly to the ongoing debates over national
security reform.
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
America stands at a crossroads. Within the past 2
decades, national security and foreign policy organizations and experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel
used to prepare for and conduct national security missions allowing the United States to exercise its power
to fullest advantage in achieving the goals of our national security strategy. If the nation is to maintain
its world leadership and influence, it must transform
its obsolete national security system to enable better
handling of the challenges and opportunities of the
changed global ecosystem. This transformation must
go beyond simple reform and doing the same things
differently. It must involve doing new things that enable us to truly establish collaborative, networked,
performance-based management of the national security system at the strategic level, management that
cascades down to the departments, agencies, and elements in the field.
Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These are:
(1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and
interagency operational planning capabilities among
civilian agencies; (2) a variety of structural deficiencies
in the U.S. Government that tend toward “stove-piping” responses, with each agency operating independently and civilian agencies being reluctant to divert
scarce resources, including personnel, from their core
missions to interagency missions; and, (3) personnel
who are not trained for interagency missions and are
often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and
cultures of other agencies.1
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Transformation of our national security system
must start at the top, with the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Staff (NSS). Former National Security Advisor General James Jones
recognized this fact early in his tenure. In a memorandum dated March 18, 2009, he asserted: “The
United States must integrate its ability to employ all
elements of national power in a cohesive manner. In
order to deal with the world as it is, rather than how
we wish it were, the National Security Council must
be transformed to meet the realities of the new century.”2 Jones’s call for transformation was echoed in
the National Security Strategy issued in May 20103 and
again in the President’s State of the Union Message in
January 2011.4
On May 27, 2009, pursuant to Presidential Study
Directive 1 (PSD-1), Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the Obama administration announced a major structural realignment that
combined the National Security Council (NSC) and
the Homeland Security Council (HSC) staffs into an
integrated National Security Staff (NSS). Additional
elements of reform and principles were included, but
this selective approach created a structure lacking full
design of the necessary functions or division of staff
labor to accomplish those functions. Unfortunately,
while the White House took initial steps in this direction, it has done little since PSD-1 to recognize this
imperative for transformation of the national security
system. As a result, both the House and the Senate included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 (Section 1072) that requires the President to report annually on the changes in necessary
functions or divisions of staff effort required to implement the National Security Strategy of May 2010.
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At the top of the U.S. national security system, the
NSC and the NSS serve as the de facto hub of the national security system. Each President since President
Harry Truman has structured and adapted the NSC
and its staff to suit his leadership style, adjust to the expanding requirements of the presidency, and respond
to significant shocks to the national security or political systems such as September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina. Although the national security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the
Cold War in 1991, the United States has not changed
the fundamental way it manages our national security
system or the role of the NSC staff/NSS as strategic
managers of the national security system to meet the
challenges and opportunities of the new global security environment. As a result of this lack of change in
the structure and functions of the NSS, the National
Security Staff remains focused almost exclusively on policy
development, staffing the President, and crisis management
rather than the long-term strategic view. A deliberate
NSS design based on strategic system management
functions, processes, and best practices will improve
the balance between departmental and the necessary
whole-of-government practices required for the global
security environment of the 21st century, and ensure
that the NSS is the strategic system manager for improving the performance, adaptability, and efficiency of
the overall national security system in achieving those
national security goals and missions that contribute to
our long-term prosperity and security.
This monograph describes a fully integrated NSS
and an interagency management system based on the
dual concepts of end-to-end process management at
the strategic level—that space between the President
and the departments and agencies—and decentral-
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ized execution and implementation that is underwritten by a whole-of-government/whole-of-nation
approach. Strategic end-to-end process management
and decentralized departmental and agency execution encompass policy, strategy formulation and longterm planning, planning and resource guidance to the
departments and agencies, alignment of department
and agency resources with national security missions,
oversight of policy implementation, and assessment
and accountability with feedback loops, as well as
development and support of the national security
system. “Whole-of-government” is defined as an approach that fosters government-wide collaboration on
purpose, actions, and results in a coherent, combined
application of available resources to achieve the desired national security objectives or end state.
Section 1072 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 requires the President to submit a report 9 months after it was signed into law (December
31, 2011) on the organizational and process changes
required to implement the National Security Strategy
issued in May 2010. This monograph offers an architect’s
concept for implementing change in the executive branch
and the foundations for a strategic partnership with Congress for transforming our national security system to meet
the rigors of the 21st century.
Part 1 of this monograph describes the challenges
of strategic management of our national security system in the new global security environment of the 21st
century. Part 2 describes the legacy 1947-89 system
that is inadequate for our national security challenges
today. Part 3 describes the attributes of a transformed
national security system. Part 4 identifies the roles of
the NSS, broad principles, and core system management functions for the Staff’s end-to-end management
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of the national security system. Part 5 sets forth a series
of best practices, processes, and the core functions the
Staff must perform for successful strategic management of the national security system. Part 6 identifies
the key tasks in development of the national security
system. Part 7 examines the issue of resourcing the
NSS (and, by extension, OMB) to perform these transformative strategic management functions. Part 8 provides a suggested outline for the President’s Section
1072 Report to Congress—a report that can establish
a strategic partnership between the executive branch
and Congress in order to anticipate and meet our national security needs for the 21st century.
ENDNOTES
1. Nina Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towell, Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and
Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 22, 2011, p. 1.
2. Memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (General James L. Jones), “The 21st Century Interagency Process,” March 18, 2009, available from foreignpolicy.com/files/nsc_memo_21.pdf, hereinafter cited as “Jones
Memo.” General Jones was a member of the Guiding Coalition
for the Project on National Security Reform prior to becoming the
National Security Advisor in December, 2009.
3. President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May
2010, pp. 14-16.
4. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Speech, January 25, 2011, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
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A NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
PART 1:
LEGACY 1947-89 NATIONAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
Strategic surprise at Pearl Harbor and subsequent military operations in World War II revealed significant
flaws in our national security machinery stemming
from the lack of unified command in Washington
and the field and ‘Roosevelt’s [FDR] intimate, personalized, ad hoc, disorderly [pattern] of World War II
decision making [that] had caused great pain at the
Pentagon and [the Department of] State.’1
The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) is arguably the second most important piece of legislation
in modern American history—surpassed only by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. It created all of the leading institutions of the national security bureaucracy [of the
Cold War] except for the Department of State.2

Our current national security system continues
to be shaped by the National Security Act of 1947
(as amended in 1949), which established the organizational and conceptual framework for providing
advice to the President on national security issues.
Born out of frustration with our World War II experience, the Act represented the first concrete step in
transforming our national security system. “The need
to restructure the national security apparatus, in fact,
had long been recognized. Between 1921 and 1945, 50
bills had been introduced into Congress to reorganize
the War and Navy Departments. None was successful in being enacted into law.”3 John Gardner, founder
of Common Cause and architect of Lyndon Johnson’s
1

“Great Society” and “War on Poverty,” explains why
in Self-Renewal: “A nation will postpone critically important social changes until war or depression forces
the issue.”4
Notwithstanding our great victory in World War
II, the experience of the war and the dysfunctional efforts to coordinate the War Department (Army and
Army Air Corps) and the Navy through mutual cooperation were thoroughly discredited. Efforts turned to
unifying the armed services well before the war’s end.
General George Marshall, as Army Chief of Staff, had
been interested in such an organization in 1943 during
planning for military operations in Europe, when he
confronted the unified positions of the British Imperial Staff and the Cabinet Secretariat in negotiations
on the war effort that were lacking in his own military
and government. Lack of a unified military command
and long-standing departmental rivalry (War, Navy,
and State) often got in the way of accomplishing Allied wartime goals.5 On Capitol Hill, discussions about
unification of the military services, led by then Senator
Harry Truman, Chair of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, were
underway in the Senate in 1944, and intensified after
he became President in 1945.6
Service resistance to the concept of military unification was particularly strong from the Navy, which, in
an effort to broaden the debate, submitted a paper in
1946 written for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
by Frederick Eberstadt that argued for the creation of
a National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate military activities with broader policies affecting foreign
affairs and economic issues.7 Significantly, unification
of the military services required the reorganization of Congress and its oversight committees. The Legislative Reor-
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ganization Act of 19468 reduced the total number of
standing committees in both the House and the Senate
and consolidated the long separate military affairs and
naval affairs committees into the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees, which were given jurisdiction over the armed forces and focused on the military aspects of national security issues; foreign policy
matters remained the purview of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, which concentrated on international affairs. This committee realignment facilitated military
unification and was an important step in transforming
the national security system.9 New committee oversight responsibilities led to several months of negotiations between the White House and the Congress,
finally leading to the National Security Act of 1947.10
The Act stopped short of full unification of the military services, as exemplified by creation of a Secretary
of Defense with little staff and retention of the service
secretaries as equals and members of the NSC, defects
which were soon recognized and rectified in the 1949
amendments.
President Truman acknowledged that the Navy’s
original NSC proposal may have been “partially designed to draw attention away from the defects of coordination between the Army and the Navy,” but he
also came to believe that the concept was the “most
important contribution” of the Navy’s report.11 At the
same time, President Truman was receiving advice
from Secretary of State George Marshall (now with
State Department equities to protect and notwithstanding his earlier wartime support for a system
similar to the British Cabinet Secretariat), from Senator Elbert Thomas (Chair of the Senate Committee on
Military Affairs), and from Harold D. Smith (head of

3

the Bureau of the Budget) that the congressional draft
legislation went beyond the goal of military unification, and
that legislative establishment of the NSC’s integrative
function as proposed in the Navy report would be a
serious encroachment on presidential authority as defined in Article II of the Constitution.12
President Truman seized the middle ground—submitting his military unification bill to Congress in February 1947 with a provision to establish the NSC by
statute, but establishing it solely as an advisory rather
than decisionmaking body. At White House insistence,
the language of the congressional draft was changed
so that the NSC role would be “to advise the President
with respect to the integration of . . . policies” rather
than “to integrate . . . policies” as proposed in the original draft legislation. The authority to make decisions,
resolve disputes between departments and direct departmental resources—fundamental authorities for
integration—remained solely the responsibility of the
President, with the NSC being a coordinating and advisory body. The council would not, in and of itself,
have the authority to integrate foreign and military
policies.13 “Finally, after months of hard work and negotiations [between the EOP, the Navy and Congress],
Congress passed Truman’s sweeping National Security Act . . . that would mean mammoth changes for
the whole structure of power in Washington.”14
But the new national security system reflected the tendency of governments to back firmly into the future.
Those who invented it had World War II and Franklin
Roosevelt in mind, not Harry Truman or the incipient
U.S.-Soviet rivalry. President Roosevelt, who once described himself as a ‘juggler,’ [dealing] with a floating
cast of characters, overlapping missions, and secretive
assignments, had little respect for cabinet departments
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and his own appointees. His crucial first visit with
Winston Churchill off Newfoundland in 1941, for example, was concealed from his Secretary of State and
Secretary of War, neither of whom attended.15

The new national security system embodied in the
1947 National Security Act, therefore, was intended
to coordinate action while simultaneously establishing order in the relations between the Cabinet and the
President. To correct the problems encountered during World War II, the Act:16
•	Corrected for the failure in strategic warning
represented by Pearl Harbor and met the need
for strategic warning of attack from the Soviet
Union, by creating the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
•	Increased the cooperation among the military
services and between the military and the powerful Department of State by creating a national
defense establishment, the position of Secretary
of Defense, an independent Air Force, and, in
the 1949 revisions to the act, the Department of
Defense (DoD).
•	Organized the domestic portion of future war
efforts by creating the National Security Resources Board to manage industrial mobilization and civil defense.
•	Created a National Security Council (NSC) that
would coordinate all these and other departmental and agency efforts so as to provide for a
fully integrated defense of the nation.
While the terms “whole-of-government” and
“whole-of-nation” were not part of the government
lexicon at the time, Admiral Sidney Souers, the first
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Executive Secretary of the NSC, pinpointed the basic
lesson to be drawn from those first 2 years: “While
much remains to be done, at least there is now a place
for coordinated consideration of our security problems.”17
The statutory function of the newly created NSC was:
. . . to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating
to the national security so as to enable the military
services and other departments and agencies of the
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. . . . [and] perform such
other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose
of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of
the departments and agencies of the Government relating to
national security.18 (Italics supplied.)

The NSC was given a full-time staff that had no
authority to direct departmental resources. Although
the NSC was not originally created as part of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the Bureau of
the Budget argued for treating the statutory Executive Secretary (not subject to Senate confirmation)
as a presidential assistant.19 Thus, in 1949, President
Truman transferred the NSC (an advisory body) to
the EOP.20 As a matter of course and consistent with
advice from the Bureau of the Budget and other advisors, President Truman initially did not usually attend
meetings of the NSC (only 12 out of 57 prior to the outbreak of the Korean War),21 to emphasize the merely
“advisory role” of this body mandated by statute.
“The NSC got off to an active start, but its main
role was to foster interagency cooperation on emerging policy issues rather than to address current presidential choices.”22 Perhaps the most significant effort
was that led by the State Department’s Policy Plan-
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ning Chief, Paul Nitze, to develop NSC-68—a national security strategy document that adopted George
Kennan’s long telegram (1946) and “Mr. X” article in
Foreign Affairs as the intellectual and conceptual basis
for our national strategy of containment in the face of
the existential threat to our nation posed by the Soviet
Union. NSC-68 was approved just 4 weeks prior to the
outbreak of the Korean War. Following that outbreak,
President Truman began to attend the NSC discussions on a regular basis, participating in 64 of the 71
meetings between June 1950 and the end of his term.23
The NSC, the NSC staff (now the NSS), and the
national security system and processes, while waxing
and waning in size and structure, have continued to
evolve from the narrowly defined advisory purpose
of the National Security Act of 1947, principally because of a change of Presidents and the expanding requirements of the presidency (including the different
governing and decisionmaking styles of successive
Presidents) or in response to significant shocks to the
national security or domestic political systems, such
as September 11, 2011 (9/11) and Hurricane Katrina.
With few exceptions,24 these changes have been implemented through presidential (not congressional) decisions, in efforts to manage the increasingly complex
national security tasks. David Auerswald provides a
brief and useful summary of the transitory nature of
the NSC, its staff, and the national security system:
In the aftermath of World War II, Truman embarked
cautiously upon the initial NSC experiment; Eisenhower transformed the NSC into a systematic and robust institution;25 Kennedy and Johnson opted for less
structure, informal procedures, and greater reliance
on the State Department; Nixon and Ford reinvigorated the NSC, while Kissinger’s plan bridged the gap
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between formalism and informalism; Carter opted
for a simple, cleaner structure with reliance on the
departments and agencies; Reagan oversaw a period
of tumult and chaos, but eventually constructed the
precursor to an enduring NSC system; George H. W.
Bush and Brent Scowcroft brought stability and set the
modern standard for the NSC; Clinton brought continuity between administrations and began to more
deliberately integrate economic policy with national
security policy; and George W. Bush elevated domestic security to the national level.26

Since 1989, the Bush-Scowcroft four-tiered structure (interagency working groups at assistant secretary level, Deputies Committee, Principals Committee,
and the NSC with the President) and functioning of
the national security system have continued to exhibit
strong patterns of organizational continuity across the
NSC system, most particularly with a White Housecentered system headed by a national security advisor, a
modest and generally under-resourced NSC staff, and the
increasing use of advisory groups and policy czars outside
the NSC system. Over time, the NSC has evolved from
the very limited advisory group initially imagined by
President Truman to a vast network of interagency
groups developed since 1989 that view themselves as
deeply involved in integrating policy development,
oversight of implementation, crisis management,
and staffing the President. As we shall see later, however, the historical record shows that policy is often
disputed more than integrated, oversight is lacking,
and crises are exercises in discovery learning rather
than strategic management or anticipatory governance. Most importantly, the result of such a system
has been the exclusion of focus on the development
of a true actionable national security strategy based
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on foresight27 and explicit choices of ends, ways, and
means, the alignment of departmental and agency resources with national security missions, oversight of
interagency policy implementation, and assessment
of and accountability for the interagency or whole-ofgovernment/nation performance.
Today’s enduring Cold War legacy national security system—designed in 1947 as a retrospective
response to Pearl Harbor, rather than a prospective
initiative for the Cold War, confirmed by President
Dwight Eisenhower with his Project Solarium and
organization of the NSC Staff and processes, and enshrined in a four-tier system designed by President
Bush and General Scowcroft in 1989—is a continuing
co-existence of departmental and agency “stovepipes”
within the intelligence and defense establishments on
one hand, and a weak mechanism for integrating and
implementing national security policies that involve
other departments and agencies, on the other. Statutory changes to the national security system (to include the
landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence) over the years have focused on
improving the traditional individual instruments of power
and their linkages to congressional oversight committees
rather than their integration and collaboration in a “wholeof-government” effort at the strategic level in both branches
of government.28 Even though there has been belated
recognition that the dimensions and attributes of our
national security have long been changing in ways
that we did not perceive, whole-of-government integration across departments and disciplines remains
elusive and is still left almost entirely to an overburdened President. A former official in the administration of President George H. W. Bush explained why:
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When it came time for decision, most representatives
. . . came armed with a mandate to defend at all costs
their particular bureaucratic sacred cows. But otherwise they were unwilling to support any policy decision, in which they took no interest and voiced no
opinion. . . . The absence of a crisis or action-forcing
event could be paralyzing even at cabinet level.29

Indeed, even as the current four-tiered national
security system was being developed in 1989, the ambiguities of the new global security environment and
President
NSC
Principals Committee
Deputies Committee
Interagency Committee

Interagency Committee

Sub-Interagency Committee

Sub-Interagency Committee

Scowcroft/Bush National Security System.30
problems of our legacy national security system were
reflected in the way successive Presidents and their
NSCs viewed the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall:
. . . [President] Bush’s and [General] Scowcroft’s experiences and perspectives made them better at dealing
with the breakdown of the old world than with building a new one. . . . Their much vaunted “New World
Order” . . . said nothing about what the United States
should do when empires break up, ethnic conflicts engulf nations, or states suffer internal collapse. . . .31

Bush, Scowcroft, and Baker had expected to manage rather than innovate. Now they were faced with
transformative events. The NSC system had to de10

velop new strategic geopolitical concepts on the spot,
but, as Scowcroft would later say, “That was one of
the most frustrating things to me. Nobody else is in a
position to do the broad, long-range thinking than the
NSC is, but I don’t know how you do it.”32
One of the first whole-of-government national security challenges to be faced in President George H.
W. Bush’s New World Order would be that of Panama, an abiding security concern for the United States
since the early 1980s. “The importance of a structured,
cooperative process below the NSC principals became
evident early in Bush’s administration, when the highlevel national security decisionmaking process clearly
broke down over Panama.”33
The State Department responded by negotiating with
Noriega over his departure from Panama, while Justice
Department prosecutors investigated his involvement
in drug-trafficking. The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), reportedly, was also in contact with him. The
Defense Department pursued another security priority, maintaining bases and training in Panama. None
of this activity was coordinated. All of it together merely
helped persuade Noriega that he could outlast a confused
United States. Ultimately, all of these U.S. Government
efforts failed . . . . Finally, the United States invaded
Panama to remove Noriega at a cost of 23 American
lives, at least several hundred Panamanian lives, and
great damage to the Panamanian economy.34

This pattern of whole-of-government or interagency uncooperativeness prior to the Panama military
operation (Operation JUST CAUSE) was continued in
the aftermath when integration of U.S. efforts on the
ground was complicated by a complete lack of preinvasion interagency planning for “how to win the
peace” and a dysfunctional U.S. embassy that refused
11

to collaborate with the U.S. Southern Command.35
Disappointingly, the lack of pre-operation, integrated
whole-of-government planning that characterized our
Panama experience in 1989 was repeated almost exactly in Iraq in 2003, both in the planning for military
operations and in the follow-on stability and reconstruction efforts by the dysfunctional Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), with far more serious consequences to our long-term national security.
One way to assess the performance of our national security system since the end of the Cold War
and Panama is to review specific cases of its operation. As part of its 2008 landmark study, Forging a
New Shield, the Project on National Security Reform
(PNSR) conducted a total of 107 case studies representing one of the most extensive collections of U.S.
national security decisionmaking and policy implementation studies ever compiled.36 More than half of
the events studied had occurred since the end of the
Cold War in a national security system that remains
basically unchanged from the four-tiered system designed by President Bush and his National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Of the cases occurring in
and after 1990, 71 percent ended up with negative
evaluations, reflecting both relatively high levels of
interagency competitiveness as opposed to collaboration and whole-of-government approaches, and high
cost (financial and political) to low benefit ratios.37
In many of these cases, there is little evidence of any
serious effort at end-to-end strategic management of
the national security system; there was little serious
assessment of, or attempts by senior national security
officials to capture, lessons learned for future use and
for developing interagency doctrine, either during or
following the events.
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Emblematic of the performance of the U.S. national
security system since 1989 is the observation of European Union (EU) Special Envoy Carl Bildt, noting
the dysfunction of the U.S. national security system
during the Balkan crises of the mid and late 1990s:
“The so-called interagency process in Washington
often took on all of the characteristics of a civil war,
the chief casualty of which was often the prospect of coherence and consistency in the policies to be pursued.”38 In the
Bosnia crisis in the 1990s, Deputies Committee (DC)
disagreements were supposed to be elevated to President Bill Clinton. However, “if a clear consensus was
not reached at these DC meetings, the decisionmaking process would often come to a temporary halt,
which was followed by a slow, laborious process of
telephoning and private deal-making; since consensus
views, rather than clarity, [were] often the highest goal of
the process . . . the result was often inaction or halfmeasures instead of a clear strategy.”39 Consequently,
the rules on the ground in Bosnia were the product of
such deal-making brokered between Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili and the
Department of State. The military Stabilization Force
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) commander got
complete freedom from any mandate to do anything
on the ground in the post-war effort if he judged any
request as posing a risk to troops. As a result, the international effort remained ineffective and incoherent
for years.40
Recognizing these difficulties, President Clinton
issued PDD56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations) in May 1997. While notable in its intended
improvements over previous interagency whole-ofgovernment planning efforts, departments and agencies actively resisted or slow-rolled this interagency
whole-of-government approach. Departments com13

plained that the planning templates and process were
too laborious, too much like the military, and too detailed to keep pace with the fast-breaking events on the
ground, both in the Bosnia peacekeeping operations
and in Haiti. Lack of support by the departments and
agencies ensured that PDD56 never matured into a
standard interagency whole-of-government approach
for planning and executing complex contingencies.41
A follow-on study evaluating PDD56 concluded that
in peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, Haiti, East Timor,
and Bosnia, and in air operations in Iraq, Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Serbia:
The White House has failed to carry out its own written directive to train government personnel to manage
complex peace-keeping operations . . . . [We have] the
ironic situation of the NSC, which had the lead in carrying out PDD56, not following a directive sent out by
the president it advises . . . and [PDD56] was largely
ignored by an administration that has sent American
troops on a record number of so-called “contingencies” on foreign soil.42

This tendency has persisted to the present, and has
even been exacerbated as the United States found itself involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan:
[A]t the strategic level in Washington, Defense Department officials . . . repeatedly undermined the formal NSC process. Defense officials would refuse to
provide advance copies of decision papers or status
reports ahead of scheduled meetings or leave copies
of reports for further examination. And finally, [D]efense officials repeatedly failed to attend scheduled
meetings. According to one official, ‘I have never
seen more high-level insubordination in almost 30
years than I have seen in this [the George W. Bush]
administration.’43
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In the field, the cascading effect of this lack of collaboration at the strategic level persists, most recently
demonstrated vividly in the use of “high value interagency target teams” in Iraq that were patiently
nurtured by Generals Stanley McCrystal and David
Petraeus over an extended period of developing personal relationships and an ad hoc interagency network
with a diverse group of agency players in the field.
While these interagency teams were a major catalyst
for success at the ground level during the military
surge operations in 2007, the parent bureaucracies of
the team members in Washington were not much interested in supporting them. Middle management at
the home headquarters and agencies of team members
proved to be a significant impediment to information
sharing on the ground. The safer the area in which an
interagency team was based, the more pronounced
the bureaucratic differences became, with the Green
Zone in Baghdad being the obvious example of a bad
environment in which the sense of a common purpose
was undermined. Sadly, once the military surge crisis
had passed, Washington bureaucracies began to lose
interest in supporting the teams and reasserted their
own priorities. By 2008, the departments and agencies
began pulling back people and cooperation, believing
that information sharing and collaboration had gone
too far44 (a problem that often confronts Ambassadors
and Chiefs of Mission with their Country Teams on a
routine basis in the steady-state environment).
Equally serious and depressing, to date, once again,
there has been no effort to institutionalize the lessons
learned from these teams within interagency doctrine
to be applied to future stability operations or to reward those who participated in the high-value inter-
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agency target teams.45 Disturbingly, CIA analysts deployed to work for the interagency teams in Iraq were
assessed for their loyalty to their parent organizations;
if young analysts in the field began using the pronoun
“we” or explaining what the team leader wanted, CIA
headquarters would conclude that they had “gone native” and forgotten their longer term perspective and
the CIA mission, and then would restrict them from
access to more sensitive intelligence.46
Indeed, the major administration policy reviews
on Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010 revealed the disturbing tendency for policy to continue to be based on
bureaucratic consensus in Washington rather than on
operational effectiveness in the field. The assessment
and reassessment of policy and strategy led by the
President stretched over 9 months, with the original
consensus reached in June undone in September by
leaks of cables from the U.S. Ambassador and General
McChrystal’s dire estimate of the Afghan situation.
The final decision, announced by President Barack
Obama in December, was once again, a consensus
decision that, like so many other decisions, provided
an escape clause for the Vice President and others opposed to the President’s military strategy.47 Unlike the
strict NSC discipline imposed by General Scowcroft
(who viewed himself as a policy broker rather than
independent policy advocate) to implement President
Bush’s decision on German reunification in 1991 (a decision that Scowcroft and the NSC staff had opposed),48
the very public debate on the significance of a definite
date for beginning the withdrawal of American forces
from Afghanistan between General Petraeus, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Admiral Michael
Mullen on the one hand, and the Vice President and
his allies on the other, resulted in confusion in both
Washington and in the field. The resulting policy was,
16

on one hand, incoherent because of mixed signals
about what it really meant, with the White House saying we are leaving by a certain date and General Petraeus and Secretary Gates saying it depended upon
the conditions on the ground; and ineffective on the
other, because it did not align the drawdowns with
the fighting seasons in Afghanistan. The policy review
also revealed flaws in the NSC system because it took
so many months to reach a decision and because the
significant leakage raised serious questions about the
NSC system’s discipline.
In like manner, the execution of the strategy for
Afghanistan following the President’s decision was
flawed. As noted by Rajiv Chandreskaran, in his recently released indepth study of the war in Afghanistan, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, “Our government was incapable of meeting the
challenge. . . . Our generals and diplomats were too
ambitious and arrogant. Our uniformed and civilian
bureaucracies were rife with internal rivalries and
go-it-alone agendas. Our development experts were
inept. Our leaders were distracted. . . . For years we
dwelled on the limitations of the Afghans. We should
have focused on ours.”49
Finally, several recent experiments in interagency
whole-of-government planning at the strategic level
have been only marginally effective because of significant departmental barriers within the national security interagency system. For the last 4 years, the NSC
has used the stand-alone National Counterterrorism
Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (NCTC/DSOP) for planning and assessments of
interagency counterterrorism activities. Importantly,
the State Department and the CIA initially declined
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to participate and have only very reluctantly agreed
to do so despite explicit statutory language to that effect. Moreover, there has been resistance in the White
House to implementing recommended reform in this
area.50 Both NCTC/DSOP and the Interagency Management System (IMS) developed by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS)51 in the interagency community
are at best “coalitions of the barely willing” that are
seldom used. Departments and agencies have resisted
participation as they did regarding PDD-56 and, as
we shall see later in this monograph, also regarding
Executive Order 14343 on National Security Professional
Development. Departments and agencies continue to
resist these integrative (collaborative) whole-of-government efforts to link resources to plans and national
security missions on a multi-year basis and provide
appropriate personnel incentives for individuals
working in interagency planning positions. All too
often, interagency planning and resourcing for national security missions remain short-term responses
to a crisis situation resulting in ad hoc or inappropriate resource alignment because of poor or rushed
planning.
In short, the way our Pearl Harbor legacy national
security system functions has remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War. The policy formulation process continues to be dominated by clashes of department-specific perspectives, and during
the policy reviews of Iraq and Afghanistan by active
vice presidential intervention. It frequently (1) fails to
move issues to crisp strategic choice, conclusion, and
implementation, (2) results in least-common-denominator truces among departments without the President being informed of disagreements, (3) produces
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weak policy recommendations based on bureaucratic
considerations rather than policy outcomes being forwarded to the President, or (4), forces principals to operate around the national security system altogether,
oftentimes through leaks to the press.52
Designing and implementing an effective standing
national interagency planning system taking into account all instruments of national power and that reports to the President through the NSS and NSC are
critical to achieving “whole-of-government” perspectives and solutions at the strategic level. Only then
can they cascade down to the operational and tactical
levels. However, the reality is quite different. As one
former NSC staff member observed:
. . . the easiest outcome to produce in the interagency
process is to prevent policy from being made. The
range of issues, the different policy perspectives of the
various departments over which department has the
lead, and the clash of personalities and egos, all place a
premium on ensuring that the equities of all involved
agencies are considered, and on building an informal
policy consensus amongst the players.53
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PART 2:
NEW GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The times, they are a-changin’.
			

Bob Dylan, 196454

Since our nation’s founding in 1776, we have
known two worlds—a world in which we could isolate ourselves behind two oceans, and a world we
could deal with by use of arms (World War II) or the
threat of arms (Cold War) backed by unmatched economic, industrial, or scientific capabilities. Now, in
the aftermath of the Cold War, 9/11, and the financial
crisis of 2008, we face a complex, globalized world
where geographic boundaries have less meaning; the
issues, threats, and actors have expanded; our relative
capacities are diminished; and new competitions for
resources are emerging. The United States has gone
from being the dominant actor in global security engagement based on states and military forces to being
the lead actor in global system management where
security possesses many more dimensions.
In the first phase of our history, the national core
values and principles enshrined in our Constitution
were validated and proven through war and our commitment to security, prosperity, peace, and stability.
Indeed, the many wars—small and large—and commitments of U.S. military forces throughout the 20th
century were shaped by threats to these core values,
both at home and abroad. American participation in
World War I was to “make the world safe for democracy.” Following the Great War, the nation reverted
to a policy of “normalcy” characterized by our long
tradition of demobilization and disengagement from
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the international arena. The policy of “well-ordered
neutrality,” in which war and peace were viewed as
mutually exclusive conditions calling for distinct institutional responses, again came to the fore.55 Isolation and “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies were again
the norm.
Nonetheless, as we entered the 1940s, President
Franklin Roosevelt had become increasingly concerned that modernity itself seemed to be permanently altering the situation of unearned security that the
United States had enjoyed for the previous 150 years.
Douglas Stuart explains:
Technology was a big part of the problem. Innovations
in transportation, communication, and the lethality of
weapons threatened traditional conceptions of time
and distance, which always favored the United States.
. . . [T]he president asserted that ‘there is a solidarity
and interdependence about the modern world, both
technically and morally, which make it impossible for
any nation to completely isolate itself from economic
and political upheavals in the rest of the world.56

After FDR’s commitment of the United States to
serve as the “arsenal for democracy” for those resisting the march of facism in Europe, we entered World
War II as an active combatant, following a physical
attack on American forces on American soil, to redeem “a day that will live in infamy” and expunge the
world of fascism. America’s Cold War national security strategy of containment for the last half of the 20th
century was anchored (1) in a belief that our global
environment was a closed system that we could control through our vast industrial base, technology, and
military/economic power; and, (2) in a determination
to achieve our national security interests which were
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most often defined in terms of traditional military
threats and diplomatic objectives.57
The aftermath of World War II and the emergence
of the United States in the late 1940s as an engaged
global power and guarantor of the international system meant that challenges to our national interests
were defined as state-based threats and risks to be
managed. A more centralized and militarized system
of foreign policy formulation became a matter of national survival. For more than 40 years—that period
we called the Cold War—our nation prospered and
was kept secure through the NSC-68 strategy of containment relying on control, deterrence (first through
mutually assured destruction, then flexible response)
”proxy wars,” and the conviction that, given the choice
between monolithic communism and democracy, the
world’s people would share the American vision for a
better tomorrow. National policies, national interests,
and competition between nation-states defined the
world of nations.
However, the architecture of the Cold War was
not fully global, and it was complicated by the dissolution of British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese
colonial empires in Africa and the Middle East. The
emerging world was characterized by rings of nations with relationships and institutions of increasingly liberal values. Moreover, this arrangement was
handicapped as politics fractionalized among the first,
second, and third worlds. Facing an existing threat
posed by the Soviet Union, our national budgets for
military defense and our participation in numerous international organizations—the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO), Organization of American States (OAS),
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and United Nations (UN)—reflected this grand strategy of containment. The Bretton Woods Agreement of
1944 continued to secure our position as the anchor
of the global economy, and the U.S. dollar continued
to serve as the internationally recognized medium of
exchange. We entered the 21st century as arguably
the most powerful nation on earth by any number of
measures.58
Nevertheless, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and the end of the Cold War in 1991 presaged a strategic vacuum that would call into question all of our
Cold War national security policies. For these were
based on the assumptions that the world was composed of a limited number of sovereign states, that
state-to-state relations were conducted through governments, and that strategic politics were conducted
much like a chess game. Revolutions in population
growth, resource management, technology, information and knowledge, economic integration, and conflict and governance have transformed that comfortable and reasonably predictable earlier world. The
issues they embody carry both opportunity and risk
for the United States.59 Increasingly, national security
is not simply about states and governments; we find
ourselves confronting an unlimited number of social
actors (most recently in the Arab Spring in North Africa and subsequent events in Syria), where the issues
are developmental, centering on building social and
political institutions rather than strategic, military, or
diplomatic ones.
With containment of the Soviet Union and monolithic communism no longer the raison d’être of our
national security system and with the rise of competing major economic powers, America’s strategic goals
of prosperity and security must now be achieved in
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a global context in which U.S. Cold War hegemony
has been replaced by competition and cooperation in
many nontraditional sectors. These sectors are linked
globally in real-time because of advances in technology. Thus true power often lies beyond the hands of
traditional national government entities.60 Hyper-connectivity through global networks means that the new
social actors are radically, digitally, and globally connected in real-time 24/7. They can and do operate independently of governments and nation-states. With
this hyper-connectivity comes the need on our part
for a high tolerance for ambiguity. We must come to
understand that there are many shades of gray rather
than a sharp dichotomy between “good” and “bad”
that characterized the ideologically-based Cold War.
Moreover, not all of the strategic preconditions for
assessing our national security interests in 1947 obtain
in today’s fractious American society. Rather than being a nation in surplus with an unrivaled techno-industrial economic base, America is heavily in debt and
has seen many of its industrial advantages migrate to
other parts of the world.61 Pundits have begun to comment on the decline of American leadership and power, and with that, on our diminished ability to unilaterally achieve security and prosperity for our people.62
The current global economic situation featuring the
rise of China as the largest holder of American debt
and the search for an alternative to oil as an energy
source have led to a questioning of the Bretton Woods
Agreement and the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Lacking the monolithic adversary posed by the
Soviet Union and faced with the universal nature of
al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats, the U.S. national
security system confronts strategic challenges that
lack military solutions or even any politically accept-
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able solutions. “Soft power,” “smart power,” and “civilian power” are becoming the watchwords of the
effort to regain our strategic security equilibrium. We
are coming to the realization that no longer can threats
to our national security be defined as “nails,” with the
only widget in our toolbox to fix those threats being
the “hammer” of military force. In a phrase, the United
States has gone from being a constant to a variable in the
world equation.63 With that transition, we are confronted with a far different concept of national security
than we were in 1947 and the Cold War that followed.
In 2008, the PNSR,64 after noting that the operative
definition of national security itself must change from
a static concept to a dynamic one, defined national security as “the capacity of the United States to define,
defend, and advance its position in a world that is
being continuously reshaped by the turbulent forces
of change.” In its view, the objectives of U.S. national
security policy were to gain:
•	Security from aggression against the nation, by
means of a national capacity to shape the strategic environment; to anticipate and prevent
threats; to respond to attacks by defeating enemies; to recover from the effects of attack; and
to sustain the costs of defense.
•	Security against massive social disruption as a
result of natural forces, including pandemics,
natural disasters, and climate change.
•	Security against the failure of major infrastructure systems, by means of building robust systems, defending them, and maintaining the capacity for recovering from damage.65
The PNSR also noted that sound economic policy,
energy security, and robust physical and human in-
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frastructures (including our health and education systems) are no less important to our national security
than our weapons and our wealth. Given the financial
shocks of 2008 and the more recent national and European debt/deficit crisis, even this expansive definition of national security may be inadequate. The Mr. Y
article entitled “A National Strategic Narrative” published in 2011 called for a new grand strategy to define
our national security interests in the 21st century.66
Former national security advisor to Vice President
Gore, Leon Fuerth, echoing the PNSR in his recent
article, “Operationalizing Anticipatory Governance,”
has suggested that our national security concerns
must also include:
•	Security against societal collapse and demoralization as a consequence of massive economic
failure;
•	
Maintenance of the foundations of national
power by means of sound fiscal policy over
time combined with long-term investment in elements of competitive strength, including physical
infrastructure, public health, and public education, especially the nurturing over time of deep
excellence in the sciences and engineering;
•	Maintenance of the capacity to perform such
guarantees as extended to formal allies and associates; and,
•	Preservation of the ability to do all of these
functions within the framework of the Constitution in a free society, governed by law, and
transparently administered.67
What is certain is that we can no longer afford to
view national security through the narrow lenses of
military security and diplomacy against a background
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of reasonably predictable state-to-state relations. National security now addresses such diverse topics
as the economy, financial sector, environment, the
homeland, pandemics, transnational terrorism, failing
and failed states such as Somalia, rising and fragile
states such as South Sudan, regional instability, cyberterrorism, and the potential use of weapons of mass
destruction by both state and nonstate actors.
The United States depends on a networked global
information grid and supply chain that is increasingly
vulnerable to catastrophic attack. The global economy
means that a single actor, governmental or nongovernmental or nontraditional—e.g., Standard & Poor’s
and Moody’s—can and often does act with significant
and immediate global impact. Transnational criminal
and ideological organizations, empowered by technology and ungoverned spaces, have found new and
increasingly sophisticated means to attack our citizens
and our values. Global climate change, demographics,
and rising global demands for finite resources raise serious concerns over the availability of food, water, and
other resources whose lack would threaten economic
and political stability around the world. Episodes such
as 9/11, Katrina, the ongoing debt and financial crises,
the flood of illegal immigrants across national boundaries, the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico, the WikiLeaks revelations, the aftermath
of the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and
most recently, the “Arab Spring” events in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, are symptoms of the
more complex, multidimensional strategic vulnerability facing our nation with no discernible constituency
community of interests that provides the cohesive and
integrated whole-of-government/nation leadership
across all spheres of national discourse. (See Figure 1.)
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Figure 1. Transforming the National
Security System.
America suddenly finds itself in an unbounded
space with multiple communities of interest operating and communicating through nontraditional social
media in real time. Rather than the seemingly linear
national security system of the Cold War founded on
the twin pillars of military defense and diplomacy, we
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have a constantly changing Rubik’s Cube of multiple,
complex, nonlinear systems, all operating at speeds facilitated by the technological and political revolutions
that characterize the global commons today. Just as
FDR realized in the 1940s, technology has conspired to
overcome even our vast superiority in weapons systems. Linear solutions designed for problems associated with state-to-state relationships and containment
of a monolithic military power no longer suffice to
guarantee our national security. In a time of “wicked
problems,” our post-World War II political, military,
and economic dominance is neither sustainable nor
guaranteed. Containment as a national grand strategy
(even with regard to terrorists or radical Islam) based
on power, control, and regional engagement are no
longer viable. Today, our focus must be on the sustainment of national prosperity (well-being) and security
founded on strength, influence, a proactive posture of
global engagement, and American renewal reflecting
our core national values.
Regrettably, these dramatic changes in the global
national security environment have not resulted in a
corresponding change in the fundamental way that
the United States manages its national security system
at the strategic level. For example, the current Department of Defense (DoD) definition of national security
remains embedded in the past:
[National security is] a collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the
United States. Specifically, the condition provided by:
a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign
nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from
within or without, overt or covert.68
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In the fast-paced, complex global security environment of the 21st century, it is axiomatic that at the strategic level, virtually all national security challenges
require an integrated whole-of-government/nation
approach across a variety of interagency and, in some
cases, intergovernmental, tribal, and private-sector actors and equities. At the strategic level, that is, in the
interagency space between the President/Executive
Office of the President (EOP) and the departments and
agencies, national security tasks and missions must be
undertaken collaboratively and jointly by the multiple
stakeholders to ensure that activities are defined and
shaped by presidential policy and national security
strategy. They must be planned, resourced, implemented, overseen, and assessed in a holistic manner.
Strategic whole-of-government/nation collaboration
requires all-source intelligence and interagency staff
ownership and review, with decisionmaking and accountability freed from the interests of specific departments or lowest-common-denominator, short-term
perspectives.
At the operational level—the departments and
agencies—many 21st century national security challenges require cooperation, that is, execution of separate tasks in pursuit of a common goal, and in some
cases interagency and intra-agency collaboration among
various bureaus and offices will be necessary as well. For
cases in which cooperation is required, strategic collaboration in Washington should ensure that separate
operational activities are designed and executed to
complement and reinforce one another.69
Similarly, in the field, at the “pointy end of the
spear,” whether in ongoing stabilization and peacebuilding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or in our
embassy country teams, coordination—the solicitation
and response to input from others—and cooperation
must combine to achieve the collaboration required
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for the minimum requirements of field whole-ofgovernment interoperability. This entails the ability of
people, organizations, and equipment from separate
departments and agencies to work together at all levels, and the ability of leaders to exercise initiative in
mutual support, including the ability to draw upon
each other’s information and expertise.70
Even though there has been belated recognition
that the dimensions and attributes of our national
security have long been changing, whole-of-government/whole-of-nation integration across departments
and disciplines at the strategic level is still left almost
entirely to an overburdened President. Our NSC system, and particularly the NSS, for managing our national security system and advising the President in
these Article II responsibilities unfortunately remains
mired in the past.
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PART 3:
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
In many ways, Washington today is a lagging indicator of how we should address national problems. Our
national security system is vintage 1947—a basic linear industrial age system. It is much like the Sears and
Roebuck Catalog sales of the 1950s trying to compete
with today’s Amazon’s online “one-click shopping.”
Our enemies are franchises while we operate our government and national security system as a regulated
steel mill of the last century.71
		
		

Major General William Navas
Former Director of NSPD-IO

The greatness in America lies not in being more enlightened than any other nation, but in her ability to
repair her faults.72
		

Alexis de Tocqueville

Today, the need for Admiral Sidney Sourer’s
highly touted “coordinated consideration” in 1949
has been replaced by the imperative for strategic management of a collaborative national security system
of systems. President Obama focused on our nation’s
future security and prosperity in his 2011 State of the
Union speech when he asked, “How do we win the
future?” He then went on to note, “We can’t win the
future with a government of the past.”73 Regrettably,
that government of the past, at least as regards the
national security system, remains, as former Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates has noted, a “hodge-podge
of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by our outdated and complex patchwork of authorities . . . and
unwieldy processes.”74 While President Obama’s National Security Strategy appears to address Secretary
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Gates’s complaint head-on, the present reality has not
matched the rhetoric of this key document.75
The national security system of the 21st century
must be more capable of incorporating all of the elements of national power, integrating intelligence,
anticipating threats and opportunities, making timely
and informed decisions, and taking decisive action.
The current vertical, rule-based system is no longer
appropriate for dealing with the “wicked,” complex
horizontal problems that characterize the global security environment. Our national security system must
think globally even while acting locally—think strategically even while acting tactically. It must prioritize investments in strengths and opportunities over
threats while lowering costs and risks.
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Figure 2. National Security System Transformation.
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“Soft power” and “hard” or “kinetic power” must
be integrated as “smart power” and employed in new
and appropriate ways. Management changes long
embedded in the private sector such as leaner and
flatter, adaptive organizations that are teamed and
networked must replace the current vertical department-centric approach to national security. Resources
and the elements of national power must be aligned
with strategic national security missions, goals, and
desired outcomes. Key attributes of a transformed national security system must include:
•	A new, comprehensive national security strategy that provides the highest level linkage of
ends, ways, and means across all elements and
sources of national strength and power and the
linkages to broader problem sets, more diverse
actors, and new constraints in the global environment;
•	Foresight and anticipatory governance that
allow the government to think and act strategically while linking long-range thinking and
foresight to policymaking, thus rejecting the
notion that the future is simply a linear extension of the past;
•	Strategic system management of the national
security system that begins with the national
security advisor and the NSS as the system
manager of networks, operating in the interagency space between the President and the
departments and agencies with a cascading of
that management system down to the departments and agencies so as to align processes
and structure, resources, and decentralized
execution;
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•	Interagency high-performance teaming that
operates in mission-focused, interagency-centric, and new collaborative patterns of work;
•	Performance-based resourcing through presidential planning and resource guidance on the
alignment of resources with national security
missions; and,
•	Focused development of the national security
system in the areas of human capital, knowledge management, and long-term planning.
Inertia and incrementalism will not suffice. The
issue is not whether enhanced integration of the elements of national power is both desirable and essential, but rather, how this strategic imperative for integration in a whole-of-government/whole-of-nation
approach can and should be effected in the context of
a still-emerging strategic narrative and national grand
strategy of prosperity and security. Such an approach
must entail engagement and renewal as articulated in
President’s National Security Strategy, and replace the
Cold War NSC-68 and national security strategy of
containment.
The point of departure must be transformation of
the NSC system beginning with the NSS to ensure a
proper focus on defining our national security strategy
as the touchstone for all that we do to guarantee this
nation’s security, prosperity, and enduring values.
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PART 4:
NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF ROLES
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
If the United States is to think and act more strategically, its government has to take an approach more
like Hall of Famer Wayne Gretzky, who observed: “A
good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great
hockey player plays where the puck is going to be.”76

Transformation of a truly collaborative whole-ofgovernment national security system must begin at
the top, at the strategic level, of the system—that is,
the NSC system and the NSS as part of the presidency
broadly construed. President Obama has identified
the goals and outcomes of a transformed national security system. But the national security strategy is totally lacking in specifics as to how to manage strategic
choices and the national security system as a system of
systems at the strategic level to achieve desired policy
outcomes. It lacks an intellectual and doctrinal underpinning such as NSC-68, i.e., a concept for operationalizing a national security strategy based on strategic
choice and an institutionalized strategic management
system such as that which President Eisenhower
implemented after Project Solarium. In all of this, a
fundamental question is: What role will the NSC, and
particularly the new National Security Staff, play in
advising the President about generating the whole-ofgovernment actions required for winning the future
and achieving our national security, prosperity, and
continued global leadership in the new global security
environment?
This is not a question of issue micromanagement
by the NSS, but rather a fundamental question of system management. Since President Eisenhower, the
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national security system has not been managed effectively as a whole of government system, largely as a result
of (1) an enduring narrow interpretation of the statutory language of the National Security Act of 1947; (2)
a persistent lack of whole-of-government perspectives
in the departments and agencies that is encouraged
and underwritten by congressional oversight; (3) lingering post-Contra concerns about getting the NSS
involved in operational matters; and, (4) insufficient
NSS size and resource support.
While Presidents have often gotten around staff
constraints by temporarily bringing in whom they
want from the rest of the government, those who are
detailed from the departments and agencies know
that they must ultimately return and often bring their
own agency viewpoints, cultures, and core competencies to the NSS rather than the needed culture of
interagency collaboration. As a consequence, the system’s current deficiencies continually force Presidents
to use more informal arrangements such as the ubiquitous “policy czars” and special envoys that bypass
agency equities and operate outside of congressional
oversight. There is a persistent and excessive focus
by an under-resourced and overwhelmed small NSS
on urgent matters and policy formulation on the action end of the strategic system management process.
There is insufficient attention devoted to the longerterm, whole-of-government/nation spectrum of national security interagency and intergovernmental
activities required to integrate all of the elements of
national power—ranging from a comprehensive and
actionable national security strategy to presidential
planning and resource guidance to the departments
and agencies, alignment of resources with national security missions, oversight of policy implementation,
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and performance assessment of and accountability for
the collaborative performance of the interagency and
intergovernmental effort.
To achieve that collaborative whole-of-government/nation effort, the national security advisor and
the NSS must be able to carry out four principal roles
to successfully manage the integration of the national
security system and advise the President on the entire
spectrum from policy formulation to the successful
employment of all of the elements of national power
to achieve our national security interests. The four distinct and critically important roles of the NSS as overseen by the national security advisor in providing the
advice and support to the President mandated by the
National Security of 1947 (as amended in 1949) are as
follows:
•	Acting as driver of the strategic end-to-end system management process(es) for the President;
•	Conducting crisis management, to include anticipating opportunities, avoiding or mitigating
“black swan events,”77 and preventing conflict,
as well as ensuring timely presidential decisionmaking and effective government action;
•	Providing staff support to the President, the
NSC, and the HSC for national security issues;
and,
•	Overseeing development of the national security system—human capital, knowledge management, and long-range planning—so the system
has the necessary capacity across presidential
administrations.
Strategic end-to-end management of the national
security system involves six core functions that would
enable the NSS to more effectively orchestrate genu-
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ine whole-of-government/nation collaboration and
integration, enabling the national security advisor to
provide more comprehensive policy and strategy advice and options for the President with crisp strategic
choices on ends, ways, and means rather than lowest
common denominator consensus policies that invite
noncompliance and foot-dragging from dissenting or
demurring departments and agencies. These strategic
system management functions mirror the general standard
in the private sector, where they have proven effective since
the early 1990s. Of special significance in the private
sector is the revolution in thinking about what a corporation is in a world with fewer boundaries. These
functions define what a corporate leadership has to
keep, with all else being outsourced to another part of
the corporation or outside the corporation. In the corporate world, success is principally about divestiture
of the micromanagement of subordinate or peripheral
issues. For the NSS, the challenge is to build that which
has not existed before—strategic system management
at the top with issue management pushed out to departments and agencies. The six end-to-end system
management functions for the national security system to support the President include:
1. Policy formulation: Develop and harmonize national security policies for presidential approval;
2. Strategy development: Use foresight to assess
capabilities, risks, and opportunities and develop
broad national security strategy and national security
goals and objectives based on strategic choices about
ends, ways, and means for presidential approval;
3. Planning and resource guidance for policy
implementation: Prepare, in partnership with OMB,
interagency planning and resource guidance to
the departments and agencies to achieve the Presi-

40

dent’s policies and national security strategy for
presidential approval;
4. Aligning resources with strategy: In partnership with OMB, ensure that department and agency
budgets and other resources are outcome-based and
aligned with long-term strategic objectives for national security missions as well as unanticipated nearerterm contingencies, rather than narrowly defined and
input-based, often over-lapping departmental competencies. Integrated national security mission budget
displays should be presented to Congress for consideration.
5. Oversight of policy implementation: Ensure decentralized implementation of presidential decisions by departments and agencies to achieve a whole-of-government
effort across all instruments of national power and the
accomplishment of national security objectives;
6. Assessment of and accountability for interagency and intergovernmental performance: Review
basic assumptions and assess the interagency and intergovernmental accomplishment of national security
objectives and policy outcomes with feedback on the
implications for policy, strategy, resources, and implementation mechanisms.
Since 1953, each President has begun his term of
office by issuing a document that outlines the national
security system for his administration. Without exception, these foundational documents have been anchored in the National Security Act of 1947, beginning
with the statutory formula, “to advise the President
as to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.” In PNSD-1,
President George W. Bush went on to state:
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That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and
assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States—domestic,
foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council [NEC]).
The National Security Council system is a process to
coordinate executive departments and agencies in the
effective development and implementation of those
national security policies.78

These foundational documents are always supplemented by organizational charts that reflect a traditional staff focus on geographic regions plus those
functional or transboundary interests that reflect the
specific national security concerns of the President
that will be dealt with in the context of our four-tiered
national security system.
What the previous principal organizing documents for the NSC have not done since Eisenhower’s
Project Solarium and design of his NSC Staff in 1953
is to define the national security system in terms of the areas of the six strategic management competencies or functions listed above that should underwrite the NSC’s
(and by extension, the Homeland Security Council’s)
work to support and advise the President in his role
as the integrator of a collaborative whole-of-government national security system. Getting away from the
current focus on functional and geographic breakdown will not be easy, since incumbents in government are educated and grow professionally in such
disciplines, not in areas of “management competencies.” (See Part 6.)
Early on, the Obama administration began to define the strategic management function in stages—to
describe the transformed government that would be
called for later in the 2010 National Security Strategy
and the 2011 State of the Union address, and to put
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its stamp on the NSC system. Several additional key
documents were employed:
1. Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1): Organization of the National Security System: Critically, PPD-1,
issued less than a month after President Obama’s inauguration, identifies the NSC as “the principal means
for coordinating executive departments and agencies.” It
keeps in place the broad outlines of the traditional
four-tiered NSC system, albeit with some subtle, yet
notable changes that firmly situate authority over the interagency at lower levels in the NSC system rather than the
departments or agencies. This policy directive structures
the NSC in such a way that the NSC staff would have
firm control over the timing, agenda, preparation for,
and dissemination of NSC meetings and products.
Importantly, PPD-1 effectively establishes the national security advisor and the NSC Staff as the key
whole-of-government integrators at every level of the
four-tiered NSC system and, by extension, gives the
White House control over the national security policy
process.79
2. General Jones’s Memorandum: “The 21st Century Interagency Process:” On March 18, 2009, General
James L. Jones, then serving as national security adviser, issued this memorandum which, though lacking
the import of an executive order or PPD, attempted
to set the stage for an active role for the NSC and its
staff to manage the national security system. It clearly
reflected General Jones’s expectations of how the national security process should be structured and run
based on his earlier discussions with the Presidentelect.80 General Jones’s memorandum began by clearly
focussing on the future and the need for transforming
the NSC system:
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The United States must navigate an environment in
which traditional organizations and means of response
to global challenges may be inadequate or deficient.
Indeed, the ability of the Nation to successfully compete in global issues is being tested in ways that were
unimaginable until recently. To succeed, the United
States must integrate its ability to employ all elements
of national power in a cohesive manner. In order to
deal with the world as it is, rather than how we wish
it were, the National Security Council must be transformed to meet the realities of the new century.81

In addition to calling for the transformation of the
NSC and the national security system, the Jones memo
made three clear contributions. First, it reaffirmed the
purpose of the NSC system and interagency process:
“As the President directed in PPD-1, the National Security Council is responsible for managing the interagency
process with respect to all national security related issues.
At its core, the purpose of the interagency process is
to advance the President’s policy priorities and, more
generally, to serve the national interest by ensuring
that all agencies and perspectives that can contribute
to achieving these priorities participate in making and
implementing policy.” Second, the memo defined the
role of the NSC and, by extension the NSC staff, as
managing a “process that is strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable—all in order to advance the national security interests of the United States.” Third,
it expanded upon each of these desirable attributes,
couching the guidance in terms of whole-of-government principles, to shape the national security system process(es). The elaborated process attributes are
as follows:82
•	
Strategic: The NSC and its principal interagency bodies should concentrate primarily on those
overarching, strategically important issues that
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will likely involve the President at some stage
in the process and ensure that all who can contribute to solving common problems will have
a “seat at the table,” and that differing views
and opinions will be heard.
•	
Agile: The NSC should be able to cope with
multiple major issues simultaneously, consider
the full range of options, and propose effective
informed decisions in an appropriate timeframe, particularly in crisis situations.
•	
Transparent: The NSC staff should be responsive to the views and perspectives of the
departments and agencies, and agencies have
a right to be aware of and participate in the
daily activities of the NSC and in interagency
meetings.
•	
Predictable: Meetings should be scheduled on
a regular announced schedule and should include an agreed-upon agenda that is provided
in advance. Discussion papers should be circulated to participants at least 48 hours prior to
regular meetings. Meetings should end with
clear agreement on what was and was not decided with summaries and conclusions being
circulated within 48 hours. Such an ending will
also include the delegation of responsibilities
for implementation. Agency representatives
must be able to speak for their agency.
3. Presidential Study Directive-1 (PSD-1): Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Findings and Recommendations: On February 23, 2009,
President Obama issued PSD-1 directing the Homeland Security Advisor to lead an interagency review
of ways to reform the White House organization for
counterterrorism and homeland security “in order to
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strengthen the Government’s ability to craft and implement sound policies designed to keep our country
secure and our citizens safe.”83
The results, publicly announced on May 27, 2009,
included a series of major findings and recommendations for transformation of the NSS and national
security system. Most notably, the President further
empowered the coordinating role of the NSC and its
staff previously promulgated in PPD-1 by announcing a major structural realignment that combined the
separate HSC and NSC staffs into a unified NSS that
would “strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to
develop and implement policies that comprehensively address the full range of transnational security challenges threatening the security of our country and the
safety of our citizens in the 21st century.”84 Additionally, the PSD-1 decision memo called for a single Executive Secretariat to eliminate competing stovepipes
and maximize administrative efficiencies; and ensuring that all other directorates with cross-cutting support missions, such as Strategic Planning, Legislative
Affairs, and the office of the Legal Advisor, support all
directorates on the newly integrated staff.85
The PSD-1 decision memo identified five functions
that the NSS would be expected to perform in the areas of counterterrorism and homeland security, and,
by implication, the broader palette of national security
missions being managed at the strategic level:
•	Advising and staffing the President and national security advisor;
•	Helping to formulate and facilitate the development of policy;
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•	Monitoring and ensuring effective implementation of presidential policy decisions;
•	Serving as honest brokers and arbiters among
the departments and agencies; and,
•	Ensuring proper management of and response
to crises while ensuring that NSS will not “go
operational” (accepting a recommendation of
the Tower Commission Report in 1987).
Other organizational and process reforms announced at this time included:
•	Better integrating state/local/tribal/territorial/public/private sector perspectives into the
national security policy process;
•	Developing a single National Security Strategy
that addresses the full range of security issues
for the country, including homeland security
and counterterrorism;
•	Inculcating a culture of inclusion and integration into the National Security Staff;
•	Institutionalizing a culture of collaboration across
the interagency and the intergovernmental cast
of players to ensure a team approach to solving
multidisciplinary security challenges;
•	Establishing the Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Outreach; and,
•	Establishing the Strategic Planning and Resiliency Directorates.
In short, PSD-1 called for a newly constituted NSS
that would “eliminate the unnecessary and potentially harmful seams posed by [the] artificial foreign-domestic divide” and better integrate interagency efforts
and a broad range of foreign and domestic national security activities, expanding on a function the old NSC

47

staff had historically performed pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended).86 Importantly,
and perhaps fatally, these recommendations were presented
as requiring no additional resources.87
Taken together, President Obama’s PPD-1/PSD-1
and General Jones’s memorandum reaffirm President
George W. Bush’s bold statement of the purpose and
the role of the NSS as the President’s system manager
of the national security system. In varying degrees,
the major departments in the national security system
are beginning to take steps to establish more functional, performance-oriented management with regard
to their core departmental functions. Significantly,
in one case (DoD), the independent panel chartered
by Congress to review the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR),88 has recommended reform measures
that would require the NSS to formally accept and acknowledge what is already a de facto reality, namely,
strategic management of the national security system
as the basis for the NSC’s advisory role to the President under the mandates of the National Security Act
of 1947. The NSS organizational structure is shown
in Figure 3.
Given the Obama administration documents cited
above, it is reasonable to extrapolate from them to a
series of organizing principles to guide the NSS in its
role of strategic management of the national security
system. These principles include:
•	The NSS drives the national security system to
meet 21st century national security opportunities and challenges.
•	The NSS maintains a focus on both long-range
strategic management (the important) and dayto-day activities (the urgent) to support the
President and crisis management.
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Figure 3. National Security Staff.89
•	The NSS operates from an integrated, collaborative, whole-of-government/whole-of-nation,
presidential perspective rather than a department or agency-specific perspective.
•	The NSS leverages the integration of all instruments of national power across the full spectrum
of national security system end-to-end management functions. Those functions include policy
formulation, strategy development, planning
and resource guidance to the departments and
agencies, alignment of resources with strategy
and national security missions, oversight of
strategy and decentralized policy implementation, and interagency performance assessment
and accountability.
•	The NSS collaborates with transparency vis-àvis the departments and agencies and, as ap49

propriate, state, local, tribal, private sector, and
nonprofit entities.
•	The NSS, through its director’s role as chair of
the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), leverages a robust structure of interagency mechanisms outside the EOP to develop strategic
whole-of-government whole-of-nation options,
resource choices and plans for presidential,
NSC, and HSC decision as appropriate.90
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PART 5:
NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
As [an organization] matures, it develops settled ways
of doing things and becomes more orderly, more efficient, more systematic. But it also becomes less flexible, less innovative, to look freshly at each day’s experience. Its increasingly fixed routines are congealed in
an elaborate body of written rules. . . . In most societies
and organizations, there grows up a choking underbrush of customs and precedent. There comes to be
an accepted way to do everything. . . . The old hand
says, “You just have to understand how we do things
around here,” and what he means is that “how we do
things” is Sound and Respectable, and The Best Way.
John Gardner91
We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking
we used when we created them.
		

Albert Einstein92

Notwithstanding its admirable goals for system
management, President Obama’s May 2009 PSD-1
decision in practice leaves the newly constituted NSS
focused almost exclusively on policy—that which is
“fun” and exciting and can be spun into a constant
crisis mode through the deeply ingrained, systemic
staff cultural practice of focusing on “black swans,”
the urgent rather than the important. Although there
is a nod to the concept of oversight of policy implementation through the Deputies Committee and the
IPCs, the NSS organization chart and the lack of any
further guidance in the form of a PPD as promised in
the President’s May 2009 PSD-1 decision memo, fail
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to give any reorganizational hint for taking the President’s national security strategy from its high rhetorical and aspirational nature in the unclassified document of May 2010 to a true national security strategy
that aligns ends, ways, and means. Nor is there any
known guidance for: providing crisp presidential
planning and resource guidance for the departments
and agencies; strategic choices on alignment of departmental resources with national security missions and
budgets as called for by former DoD Secretary Gates
and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton;93 development
of interagency and intergovernmental implementation strategies by the NSS-chaired IPCs; or oversight
of policy implementation and assessments of and
accountability for interagency and intergovernmental policy, strategy, and implementation outcomes.
Rather, the NSS organization promulgated by PSD-1
is a very flat one composed of very thinly resourced
directorates that currently have little if any capacity
to go beyond policy formulation, crisis response, and
staffing of the President that the Staff has traditionally
done.
If enacted, many of the core roles and strategic management functions proposed by the Independent QDR
Panel and the PNSR (and reflected in this monograph)
would continue to flesh out previous initiatives by the
Obama administration and do not involve the shifting
of statutory authorities or placement of the national
security advisor or the NSS in the chain of command
between the President and the departments. Rather,
they are consistent with the previously cited statutory
language of the National Security Act of 1947:
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to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and
other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national
security . . . [and to perform] such other functions as
the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to
national security.94

A deliberate NSS design based on adding the strategic end-to-end system management functions to the
present NSS organization, as reflected in Figure 3,
would improve the balance between departmental/
agency practices and the necessary whole-of-government/nation practices required for the global security
environment of the 21st century. Moreover, it would
ensure that the national security advisor, supported
by the NSS, is the strategic manager for improving the
performance, adaptability, and efficiency of the overall national security system.
Best Practices.
Critical next steps for achieving non-legislative elements of transformation of the NSS to a true strategic
system management role include:
•	
A formal description of the national security system
and National Security Staff functions and processes, e.g., an Executive Order and/or Presidential
Policy Directive (PPD). This document should:
— Describe how departments and agencies, together with the NSC and the NSS, constitute
the national security system;
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— A
 rticulate the roles and strategic management functions of the national security advisor and NSS;
— Articulate and establish expectations that
senior officials approach policymaking issues from a national rather than departmental perspective;
— Require the production of time-sequenced,
aligned, and nested periodic strategy documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy,
departmental quadrennial reviews, national security planning, and resource guidance
to the departments and agencies); and,
— Define processes for the alignment of resources with desired outcomes, collaborative implementation plans, and performance
assessments of and accountability for the
whole-of-government/whole-of-nation national security system.
•	Job Descriptions: The advisory roles and responsibilities of the national security advisor should
be established in a Presidential Decision Directive. In turn, the national security advisor
should promulgate the advisory roles and responsibilities for the principal deputy national
security advisor, the chief of staff, the assistants
to the President/deputy national security advisors, the executive secretary and the senior
directors of the strategy, functional/transnational, regional, and resiliency directorates.
•	Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs): As noted earlier, President Obama’s PPD-1 establishes the IPCs as “the main forums for day-to-day
interagency coordination of national security
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policy” and firmly situates authority over the
interagency at lower levels in NSS rather than
the departments and agencies. The IPCs are
chaired by the NSS directors (and jointly by the
National Economic Council staff as appropriate) who are empowered system-level agents
for the President unless the Principals Committee (PC) or Deputies Committee (DC) specifies
otherwise, and are composed of assistant secretary-level officials. IPC topics and focus should
reflect key national security missions emanating from the national security strategy—e.g.,
Afghanistan, climate change, the financial crisis, or the Arab Spring—which are or should be
driving the integrated and collaborative efforts
of the departments. The President, PC, or DC
may direct that an IPC be co-chaired or chaired
by a departmental representative, although
such an arrangement tends to weaken the concept of an IPC leader as providing a clearly
delineated, whole-of-government/nation perspective and may cause other IPC members to
view the IPC as being run by one department
rather than a neutral chair. Key points concerning IPC structure and functioning include:
— Charter/Terms of Reference: Each IPC
should have a written charter or terms of
reference (TOR) approved by the President,
PC, or DC that sets forth the IPC’s topic,
functions, membership, deliverables, schedule, and processes. Draft charters should be
written by the NSS with departmental input
and submitted through the national security
advisor for approval to the DC, PC, or President as appropriate. The terms of engage-
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ment should guarantee fair process, full
inputs from participants, and living with
outcomes rather than brokered agreements.
Charters should be reviewed annually for
necessary changes, including termination
of the IPC.
— Strategy/Resource Alignment: Each IPC
should have a designated OMB representative who would attend IPC meetings and
advise the NSS and IPC members concerning resource implications and tradeoffs and
the preparation of national security mission
budget displays.
— IPC Documents: IPC documents should be
submitted by the IPC chair rather than by
the IPC members as consensus products.
The documents should note the degree
of consensus regarding particular issues.
However, the documents should include
the NSS perspective, particularly to provide
a crisp, whole-of- government perspective
to balance departmental or least-common
denominator consensus perspectives and to
present the DC, PC, and the President with
clear strategic “ends, ways, means” choices.
— Implementation Reviews: IPC chairs should
conduct quarterly policy implementation
reviews to identify problems in policy
execution as well as any significant situational changes. The focus of the reviews
should be on organizational learning and
improved interagency policy formulation
and implementation, not on NSS-departmental conflict based on a no-fault, zerodefects mentality.
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•	Cascading strategies: A central tenet underlying
strategic management of the national security
system by the NSA/NSS should be the practice
of cascading strategies, that is, the downward
flow of organization-specific (policy committee, department, agency team, etc.) implementation strategies and management systems
from the higher echelon to the lower echelon,
starting with the NSS at the top. Grand strategy and a national security strategy couched
in terms of ends, ways, and means developed
for the President by the NSC and NSS should
inform presidential planning and resource
guidance to the departments and agencies as
well as issue-specific mission implementation
strategies—which, in turn, should inform more
specific implementation plans and guide oversight of implementation—all of which should
then be assessed through the interagency lens
in order to inform the next iteration of strategy and each component of the cycle. The 2010
State/USAID Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), and PSD-7 (U.S.
Global Development), developed in parallel processes by State/U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the NSS, appear
to be closely linked and mutually reinforcing
documents that establish the role of the Staff as
manager of the national security system. (See
Appendix 2.)
•	Interagency and Intergovernmental National
Security Planning Capabilities: Uniform, robust national (federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organization
[NGO]) planning activities must be further de-

57

veloped, and at the federal level, planning cells
must be better utilized in the interagency space
outside the EOP. Although the Government
Performance and Results Modernization Act of
2010 (GPRAMA)95 mandates strategic planning
on a 4-year time horizon for departments and
agencies, with the exception of the DoD, the
federal government does not yet have either
an interagency or intergovernmental planning
framework. Substantial improvements must
be made to the federal departments and agencies, including the ability to develop short- and
medium-term plans based on the President’s
strategic planning and resource guidance.
Designing the NSS System Management Functions.
 Policy Formulation: Historically, the NSC staff has
focused on policy. NSS members, in their capacity both
as IPC chairs and staff directors, currently have the
lead role in driving day-to-day policy formation for
approval by the DC, PC, and the President. The new
NSS should be informed by a whole-of-government/
nation appraisal of the global security environment to
develop and construct national security policies for the
President. More than a staff prioritization of goals and
itemization of obstacles to achieving those goals, the
NSS must formulate policies that synchronize the elements of national power to achieve those goals. Policy
should set the course for simultaneous adaptability
and interagency collaboration in short, medium, and
long-term time horizons. Enabled by foresight and
over-the-horizon analyses, the NSS would identify
emerging issues and opportunities and find ways to
ramp up efforts on current pressing issues. Properly
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resourced staff directorates of the NSS would have
the lead role in day-to-day policy formulation at the
strategic level while departments, agencies, and empowered interagency teams would develop cascading
strategic implementing policies at their own levels.
 Strategy Development: Strategy counts! Former
Army Chief of Staff General Gordon L. Sullivan,
when commenting on his program of the Louisiana
Maneuvers designed to help define Force XXI and the
Army’s role in modern warfare in the information age
after Operation DESERT STORM, once remarked that
“if you don’t know where you’re going, any road will
get you there,” then wryly noting that “hope is not a
method.”96
The strategy development function, often undervalued in the heat of policy and crisis response, is
one of the most critical to the strategic management
process.
The core of strategy work is always the same: discovering the critical factors in a situation and designing a
way of coordinating and focusing actions to deal with
those factors. . . . A good strategy does more than urge
us toward a goal or vision. A good strategy honestly
acknowledges the challenges being faced and provides
an approach to overcoming them. Bad strategy tends
to skip over pesky details . . . [and] ignores the power
of choice and focus trying instead to accommodate a
multitude of conflicting demands and interests. Bad
strategy covers up its failure to guide by embracing
the language of broad goals, ambition, vision, and values. Each of these elements is, of course, an important
part of human life. But by themselves, they are not
substitutes for the hard work of strategy.97

In a world of fierce competition for resources and
quality life, strategy is more about what we choose to
forgo than what we choose to embrace. This requires
59

redirecting the national tendencies of the system from
serving stakeholders of the status quo rather than priorities rooted in our national interests. Unless national
security goals are articulated, resource tradeoffs and risk
assessments are explicitly recognized and resolved, and
such goals and tradeoffs drive resource allocation—
then national security policymaking and strategy will
eventually produce incoherence, uncoordinated departmental actions, or, at best, weak, least-commondenominator approaches. As Rosa Brooks states:
Grand strategy is ‘the big idea’ of foreign and national
security policy—the overarching concept that links
ends, ways and means, the organizing principle that
allows states to purposively plan and prioritize the use
of ‘all instruments of national power,’ diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military. A grand strategy can’t
be a list of aspirations, wishes, or even a country’s
top 10 foreign-policy ‘priorities.‘ (When you have 10
priorities, you really have no priorities at all.) Grand
strategy is the big idea that guides the tough decisions,
helping policymakers figure out which of those top 10
priorities should drop off the list, which aspirations
are unrealistic and impossible, and which may seem
like good ideas on their own, but actually undermine
the nation’s broader goals.98

A cogent example of the task of developing the
national security strategy was the mid-1970s effort
by Andy Marshall and James Roche to redefine defense during the Cold War in new terms that differed
from the exclusive focus on Soviet strengths, defined
as threats. Perhaps it was smarter to focus on Soviet
weaknesses and constraints that would enable the
United States to compete with the Soviet Union over
the long term. The new strategic concept of competitive
advantage as a part of the grand strategy of contain60

ment focused on seeking opportunities and engaging
in actions that imposed exorbitant costs on the other
side. In particular, it recommended investing in technologies that were expensive to counter and where
the counters did not add to Soviet offensive capabilities. The goal was to break the budget-driven “balance
of forces” logic of 1976.99 Although it is too early to
render judgment, President Obama’s recent Strategic
Guidance100 for the DoD may well be a similar effort.
But the “strategic pivot” outlined in the document
must be assessed against the realities of our own fiscal
situation and the ironic fact that we now borrow billions from the Chinese to create and sustain the forces
to contain China’s imputed ambitions in the Pacific.
The tendency of the NSS to focus on crisis management and the urgent at the expense of strategy
can be countered only by the creation of an effective “strategy cell” tasked to do this hard work. The
newly dedicated NSS Strategic Planning Directorate
outlined in the PSD-1 decision memorandum—dedicated to foresight, properly resourced, and freed of responsibility for daily policy implementation or crisis
management—should focus on the Staff’s core system
management function of developing grand and longterm national security strategies for presidential approval rather than serving simply as a “fire brigade”
or “skunk works” for the national security advisor. In
line with General George C. Marshall’s directive for
the creation of the Policy Planning Office at the State
Department, the Strategic Planning Directorate should
“look ahead, beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle,
far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things
to come and outline what should be done to meet or
anticipate them.”101 A good grand strategy and na-
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tional security strategy are implemented over a long
period of time—much longer than it takes to conceive
them. Changes are generally evolutionary, but there
is a requirement for periodic evaluations of execution
and the application of the elements of national power.
The Strategic Planning Directorate should “coordinate the preparation and sequencing of the President’s
national security strategy and other strategic planning documents, provide policy recommendations on
specific subject areas for the medium and long terms,
question existing and present alternatives, and plan
for high-impact contingencies.”102 It should consist of
strategists, experts in foresight, policy planners, and
resource specialists who are “multilingual” in interagency communications.103
Many pitfalls lie in front of the current Strategic
Planning Directorate on the NSS. Several previous administrations have tried to create one; none have been
demonstrably successful because the “strategy people” have never been fenced off from current affairs
and were overwhelmed by the constant pressures of
responding to urgent day-to-day crises and bureaucratic infighting. Peter Feaver and William Inboden,
who worked in the Bush administration’s Directorate
for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform (consisting of just four people), described their duties and
impressive portfolio as falling into five broad baskets:
1) cross-cutting, top-level strategy; 2) longer-range
analysis; 3) internal critique; 4) policy incubator; and,
5) outreach. They noted that Strategy Directorates also
face the dilemma of intruding into the domain of operators, while ensuring that strategy is not removed
from the realities on the ground.104 At present, the
Strategy Planning Directorate is formally tasked to
perform five core functions: 1) support of the admin-

62

istration’s top national security priorities, particularly
those that require the development of broad policy
guidance; 2) assistance on urgent crises; 3) supporting
the President’s engagement of and outreach to key allies, partners, and the strategic community; 4) ensuring that strategic and contingency planning conforms
to presidential guidance; and, 5) assisting the national
security advisor with special projects.105 In practice,
however, the directorate spends most of its time on
current crisis response because there is no effort by
the President or the national security advisor to drive
a comprehensive strategy development effort.
Richard Rumelt tells us that “strategy is an exercise
in centralized power, used to overcome the natural
workings of a system. Good strategy and good organization lie in specializing on the right activities and imposing only the essential amount of coordination.”106
The NSS should drive the strategy process and finalize
the result rather than trying to do all of the work from
start to finish. If the current Strategic Planning Directorate matures and is properly resourced—it began
with four staffers under Presidents Bush and Obama
and now has just two personnel—we should expect it,
working closely with OMB, to produce three strategy
documents for presidential approval in collaboration
with other staff components as well as the departments and agencies. Although initial drafts or components of the national security strategy may come
from the departments, these strategy products should
be products of the NSS submitted through the NSC
and approved by the President. Equally important,
these presidential strategy documents should be mutually consistent and supportive among themselves,
and an organization-specific version of each should be
prepared at each lower echelon. The departments and
agencies will thus be informed as they conduct their
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mandated quadrennial reviews and develop their internal strategies and budgets that support the President’s national security strategy. The three documents
are as follows:
•	
National Security Review (NSR). The NSR should
be done in the first year of an administration and
focused on getting beyond the heated rhetoric of
campaign promises. This is when the President
has the maximum power to move the system
rather than having the system move him. The
NSS Strategy Planning Directorate should lead
the NSR to review and formulate the national
security strategy of the United States that contains three elements: diagnosis, guiding policies, and coherent action. The NSR would be
the administration’s strategy guide to ends-waysmeans decisionmaking that gathers inputs from
top strategists and policy planners from across
the national security interagency system as well
as outside stakeholders and experts. The NSR
would be designed to (1) assimilate and describe
the strategic landscape, including an analysis of
major ongoing or foreseeable worldwide commitments, the identification and prioritization of
current and foreseeable threats to national security, and future-oriented strategic assessments
of over-the-horizon trends and opportunities
involving such areas as China, India, or the Arctic that significantly affect national security; (2)
assess existing capabilities and resources against
those necessary to successfully achieve our national security goals and objectives; (3) examine
and make recommendations to the President
regarding the missions, activities, and budgets
across the national security system; and, (4) re-
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view the scope of national security, including
changes in the roles and responsibilities of the
interagency, intergovernmental, and outside
stakeholders. This strategic review should be
aimed at the heart of the most important issues
and with direct presidential investment of time
and brainpower to make the review meaningful
and consequential.
	 The NSR would be conducted on a quadrennial cycle, with the principal review conducted
during the first year of a President’s administration and with updates performed annually.
The NSR would inform department-specific
reviews such as the current ODNI National Intelligence Strategy, DoD Quadrennial Review, the
National Defense Strategy, the National Military
Strategy, the DHS Quadrennial Review/Bottom
Up Review and the State Department/USAID
Diplomacy and Development Quadrennial Review
(QDDR).
	 These reviews would be done early in the second year of a presidential term so as to inform
the next budget cycle after being informed by
the NSR/National Security Strategy/NSPRG
(National Security Planning and Resource
Guidance). A key feature of the annual review
would be a questioning and analysis of the basic assumptions underlying the NSR, to include
constructive anticipation and alternative overthe-horizon views of the future security and
budgetary environments that address emergent
threats, conflict prevention, opportunities, and
anticipated or unanticipated national security
mission partners.
•	
The National Security Strategy (Strategy). Based
on NSR findings and guidance, this is the Presi65

dent’s national security strategy as required
since 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols Act—a
narrative political document that translates
the President’s broad national security objectives and policies into a coherent strategy that
firmly establishes in terms of ends, ways, and
means, the President’s general national security objectives and strategic choices supportable
by available resources by region and national
security mission. The Strategy would identify
significant challenges and opportunities in the
international security environment and implications for domestic security policy. The Strategy would be published in the first year of each
administration following the NSR and establish
prioritized national security objectives and resource
decisions, as well as criteria to manage risks and
opportunities in the global security environment.
The National Security Strategy would provide
unifying direction to department and agency
strategies and policy planning and the department quadrennial reviews. It would have an
unclassified public section that would satisfy
current statutory reporting requirements, accompanied by a classified annex.
•	
National Security Planning and Resource Guidance
(NSPRG). This document would translate National Security Strategy into presidential policy,
planning, and resource guidance to departments,
agencies and interagency teams, including
guidance concerning resource allocation and
the necessary capabilities to be developed for
current or future needs. The resource guidance
would provide annually updated 6-year resource
profiles covering each department/agency’s
capabilities for meeting future national secu66

rity needs as defined in the National Security
Strategy. The NSS and OMB would jointly develop and issue the President’s resource guidance each year at the beginning of the annual
program/budget cycle and use that guidance
as a validating standard during the fall budget
review cycles.
The very flat organization of the current NSS relies on thinly staffed and overwhelmed directorates to
accomplish its work. Since the work of the Strategic
Planning Directorate is fundamental to our national
security with the consequent need to keep it focused
on the future rather than daily crisis management, this
emerging section of the NSS should best be elevated
to a divisional level headed by a Deputy Assistant to
the President and Deputy Assistant National Security
Advisor for Strategic Planning. This Strategic Planning Division staff should be adequately resourced
and have primary responsibility for producing the
three fundamental documents in consultation with
each NSS directorate. In addition, the Division may
assist each directorate in producing its short-term
implementation strategy products. The division
would work closely with the IPCs to tap their expertise. Finally, the regional and transnational or functional directorates would use the findings of the NSS
policy implementation assessments as the basis for
strategy and planning. Such collaboration would be
particularly important for the OMB/Strategic Planning Division’s joint development of planning and
resource guidance.
This new division would have three directorates,
each focused on one of the product lines identified
earlier:
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•	The National Security Environment Assessments
Directorate would lead the quadrennial National
Security Review and annual updates.
•	The Strategy Formulation and Guidance Directorate would focus on the periodic national security strategies and annual policy and planning
guidance.
•	The Resources and Capabilities Directorate would
concentrate on linking strategy and resources
by working closely with OMB and the departments and agencies to develop planning
resource guidance and national security mission-budget displays (in accordance with the
requirements of the Government Performance
and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). This directorate should have a close
working relationship with designated OMB
personnel so that the combined effort becomes
again a single Staff/OMB cell, although OMB
would not report to the NSS.
Cascading, issue-specific interagency implementation strategies for national security missions would
not be drafted by the Strategic Planning Division, but
instead would be informed by the National Security
Strategy and the President’s planning and resource
guidance, and coordinated and drafted by NSS IPC
Chairmen in conjunction with their IPCs. However,
IPC Chairmen should consult members of the Strategic Planning Division to ensure continuity between
the President’s grand strategy, policy, national security strategy, planning and resource guidance documents, and the IPCs’ issue-specific documents.
The newly formed Strategic Planning Division
would periodically report to the President and would
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have a cadre of issue-specialists who would assist
each other in producing its products while continuing
to work closely with the IPC-oriented transnational/
functional and regional directorates to tap their expertise and ensure that grand strategy, the National Security Strategy, and the President’s planning and resource
guidance are not developed in a vacuum, but rather,
through strategic assessment, foresight, and forward
engagement.107 It could even be supported by a Center
for Strategic Analysis and Assessment (CSAA) similar
to the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate
of Strategic Operational Planning (NCTC/DSOP).108
The role of the CSAA would not be to create policy—
that is the role of political leadership. Rather, such a
center would provide a context and analytical basis to
facilitate the development of forward-looking strategy
by providing policymakers with an understanding of
the range of possible futures they face and enabling
them to see areas of convergence and overlap among
departments. The CSAA, unburdened by the need to
make or implement policy or engage in crisis management, would be totally devoted to problem analysis,
research, scenario development, contingency planning, gaming, and assessment. (See Figure 4. The new
strategic system management functions are located in
the shaded area.)
Finally, grand strategy and the national security
strategy are a tier above the issue-based implementation strategies for national security missions developed by IPCs for their individual areas and thus merit
higher-level involvement than the assistant secretaries who attend IPCs and who have responsibility in
their departments for only a subset of the strategic
issues facing the departments. The Deputy Assistant
to the President and Deputy National Security Advi-

69

70

Afghanistan
-Pakistan

Africa

Int'l
Development
Democracy & Stabilization

Middle
East

Asia

International
Economonics

Gulf

Central
Region

South
Asia

Russia &
Central Asia

Europe

International
Environment & Energy

DAP/DNSA for
Int'l Economics/
Development

National
Eceonomic
Council

Western
Hemis

Press
Speech &
Communications

Int'l Arms
Control &
Non-Proliferation

Defense

WMD
Terrorism &
Threat
Reduction

WMD
Coord

Capabilities

Intel

Cyber
Coord

Policies &
Partnerships

CounterTerrorism

AP/Homeland Sec &
Counterterrorism/DNSA
DAP/Homeland Security

Response

Resilience

WH Sit Room

Preparedness

TransBorder
Security

Records

Info
Sharing

Admin

Executive
Secretary

Legal Advisor &
Deputy WH Counsel

Legislative
Affairs

Strategic
Planning

Interagency Strategic
Advisory Board

Resources and
Capabilities

Strategy Formulation
and
Guidance

Strategic
Survey

DAP/DNSA for
Strategic
Planning

Figure 4. Proposed National Security Staff
for the Future.

MultiLateral &
Human
Rights

Global
Engagement

DAP/DNSA for
Strategic
Communications

DAP/DNSA for Operations
& CoS

Nat'l Security Advisor
AP/P DNSA

President of the
United States

Capabilities
Assessment
(DIMEFIL+)

Implementation
Assessment

Strategy
Assessment

DAP/DNSA for
Interagency
Assessment

Long-Term
Planning

Knowledge
Management

Human
Capital

DAP/DNSA for
Interagency
System
Development

sor for Strategic Planning should be advised by an interagency strategic advisory board composed of the
departments’ undersecretaries for policy or equivalents, with meetings to be attended regularly by the
heads of their policy planning offices. Indeed, there
is already precedent for such a body in NSPD-60,109
which reflected former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley’s recognition of the need to strengthen
the development of national security policy at the
strategic level. Although flawed because it did not
establish primacy over traditional departmental planning efforts and provided no formal NSS leadership,
no link-up with OMB or other resource agencies, and
no increase in staff to perform the policy development
function, NSPD-60 remains in effect and is a point of
departure for establishing the advisory function. This
interagency strategic advisory board would meet less
frequently than the IPCs or DC, in part due to the
nature of grand strategy and also because the under
secretaries for policy often attend DCs in place of their
respective deputy secretaries.
Planning and Resource Guidance for Policy
Implementation: In its role as strategic manager of
the national security system, the NSS would develop
planning guidance for the interagency-based strategies approved by the President. The President’s
guidance would include prioritized strategic threats
and opportunities that require the development of
integrated interagency and intergovernmental implementation plans or contingency plans. The guidance
would be sent to the department, agency, and interagency team level, where the operational and programmatic plans would be developed for implementation. The integrated plans would then be re-elevated
to the NSC or HSC as appropriate for approval. The
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content of these NSC/HSC-approved plans would be
sufficiently detailed to drive the development of comprehensive operational-level interagency plans with
specific tasks and resources identified by department
or agency. At a minimum, the presidential planning
guidance would provide the following for each issue
area: assumptions, overall strategic intent, resource
considerations, coherent action for desired outcomes
and measures of success, a timeline for plan completion, and subsequent submission to the NSC and HSC.
Aligning Resources with Strategy—Integrating
the Elements of National Power: Former OMB Director Richard Darman once said, “Policy without budget is just talk.”110 Although listed as a separate core
management function, alignment of departmental
and agency resources with presidentially-approved
national security missions is the thread that links all
of the NSS core strategic management functions together. At a minimum, the President’s planning and
resource guidance would provide overall strategic intent, resource considerations, expected outcomes, and
timelines for completion.
Submission of integrated budgets for national security
missions: The first effort to develop an NSC-led interagency budget around a NSC-managed national
security mission took place during the Clinton administration under Richard Clarke, widely known as
the “counterterrorism czar.” Clarke (operating largely
on his own recognizance) ultimately integrated and
directed nearly $11 billion in departmental funds toward this mission, and for a while attended Principals
Committee meetings of the NSC. This practice was
quietly discontinued by Condoleezza Rice during her
tenure as National Security Advisor. Currently, the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and
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the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South)
come together as “coalitions of the willing” to produce interagency budgets for their narrowly defined
national security mission areas and operations. While
not perfect solutions, they provide proof-of-principle
that various agencies and departments can come together to develop mission-oriented budgets.
Former Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary
of State Clinton called for unified national security
budgets, and the State/USAID QDDR called for the
first submission of a unified State-Defense development budget for FY 2012. This important first step has
been realized in the Global Security Contingency Fund
contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, as sent by
Congress to the President on December 21, 2011), as
well as in the House’s FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Section 924, H.R. 2583. While this is a
promising first step, the concept of integrated national
security budget submissions must be extended to other departments with security equities beyond DoD,
State, and USAID, and to other national security mission areas for presentation to Congress (perhaps those
embodied in the current list of functional directorates
on the NSS). This important work must be informed
by presidential planning and resource guidance based
on the national security strategy and annual national
security reviews and close departmental collaboration
(working jointly on the same mission) with OMB and
the NSS, with OMB participation in the IPCs and subIPCs that help to define our interagency and intergovernmental strategies and resource requirements for
national security missions.
The original Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) of 1993111 was intended to strengthen de-
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partment and agency efficiency and performance of
core missions—a laudable goal, especially in an era
of declining resources and fiscal constraint. However,
this sub-optimal focus on efficiency at the department
level has had the unintended consequence of reinforcing the “stovepipe behavior” that has worked against
the grain of interagency collaboration. The GPRA
Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010112 points to a
better way and provides a statutory basis for developing integrated budgets for national security missions.
The act’s focus on identification of cross-cutting issues
that are inherently interagency is a departure from the
original act’s exclusive focus on government performance within agencies. Although GPRAMA identifies
five areas for implementation, none are currently national security missions. However, that does not and
should not preclude the cross-cutting analysis called
for in GPRAMA in national security missions, to include departmental and agency overlaps, gaps, and
achievement of intended national security goals and
outcomes.
Finally, the submission of integrated national security budgets requires a more robust defense and
explanation of presidential budgets on Capitol Hill.
This, in turn, may well require a relaxation of prohibitions of presidential advisors testifying as a part of the
rebalancing of executive and legislative branch actors.
It will also require that the NSS, in conjunction with
OMB, monitor and react to the progress of unified
national security mission budgets working their way
through Congress.
Oversight of Policy Implementation: Following
the Iran-Contra Affair, the Tower Commission recommended that the NSC staff be barred from conducting operations. The exact definition of “operations”
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remains unclear and can be interpreted broadly to
preclude any role for the new NSS in policy execution.
Departments have been particularly vigilant concerning this prohibition in order to prevent rogue operations run by the White House, and apparently to some
lesser extent to preserve institutional prerogatives.
White House staff members also have an interest in
this prohibition, as it clearly places responsibility and
accountability for policy execution on the departments, but not necessarily, on the interagency effort.
In the sense of tactical-level activities carried out
by departments in executing policy, the PSD-1 prohibition on the NSS conducting operations is a correct
decision because such a role is beyond staff expertise,
would serve only to distract the NSS from its strategic
focus and system management responsibilities, and
would interfere with departmental or interagency
chains of command. However, the new NSS should
have a legitimate role in overseeing and assessing
whole-of-government policy execution in order to ensure that presidential policies are being implemented
effectively and efficiently and to be able to highlight
and help resolve any execution problems.
The directorates of the NSS have the lead role in dayto-day oversight of policy implementation. Additionally,
members of the Staff directorates chair the IPCs that
correspond to their area of responsibility, and in doing
so serve as the drivers of interagency policy formulation and implementation. Operational and tacticallevel activities to implement the President’s national
security strategy carried out by departments, agencies, and interagency teams should be reviewed on a
periodic basis to ensure whole-of-government/nation
understanding of the President’s policy and resource
decisions and guidance. NSS directorates would iden-
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tify and check bureaucratic drift to prevent national
interagency missions from mutating into traditional
sub-optimal department and agency missions based
on core competencies of a lead agency.
The NSS directorates would also work closely
with OMB to advise on policy considerations relevant
to OMB’s annual budget reviews of department and
agency national security programs. The regional and
transnational/functional directorates would also have
the lead for reviewing draft congressional testimony
on national security missions. The regional and transnational/functional directorates would also assist the
President in the day-to-day conduct of national security policymaking. However, as much of the work as
possible should be delegated to departments and/or
to other White House elements in order to free NSS to
focus on longer-term strategic issues and national security interagency system management and development rather than daily issue management. The duties
of the NSS directorates can be summed as follows:
•	Regional Directorates should reflect and reinforce a common U.S. Government interagency
map. It may be advisable to create a new Canada/Mexico Affairs Directorate because many
policy issues related to Canada and Mexico
have direct implications for homeland security
(e.g., border security, immigration, and crossborder violence) and are often substantively
different than those facing Latin America—
thus meriting a separate directorate.
•	
Transnational/functional directorates on the
NSS should focus on key transnational policy
and national security mission areas such as
cybersecurity, energy, homeland security and
counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons
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of mass destruction, international economics,
health and the environment, human rights and
democracy, and global outreach, and on how
to marshal all instruments of national power in
an integrated fashion to achieve our strategic
goals in those areas.
•	The International Economics Division should
continue to be led by an official dual-hatted as
a member of the NEC staff in order to prevent
overlap, duplication, or discontinuity between
the NSS and the NEC.
In addition, the NSS policymaking and oversight
processes should be enhanced and informed by current
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, private
sector, and NGO personnel participating directly at
all levels and functions of the NSS management processes, as appropriate. PSD-1 recognizes that formal
and ongoing collaboration with, and input from, such
nonfederal partners are essential to the homeland security (including emergency management) domain
of the national security mission. In coordination with
the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
(IGA) and Domestic Policy Staff, the new Directorate
for Resiliency, established by PSD-1, should convey
nonfederal perspectives on homeland security policy,
including emergency management issues, at all levels
of the 4-tiered NSS process. This directorate should
provide input on the full range of national security
interagency system functions related to homeland
security—ranging from strategic guidance to implementation, assessment, and risk management. For
example, the directorate, in conjunction with several
of the transnational directorates, would recommend
homeland security issues, including emergency man-
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agement, for consideration at PC, DC, and IPC meetings. PPD-8, Preparedness,113 issued by the President in
March 2011, is a welcome step forward in this area.
Assessment and Accountability for Interagency
and Intergovernmental Performance: The President’s
National Security Planning and Resource Guidance
(NSPRG) to the departments and agencies would inform the interagency performance assessment function. The NSPRG, which would specify desired policy
outcomes and each organization’s interagency responsibilities, resourcing needs, and commitments, should
provide a benchmark for evaluating whether departments
are collaborating to commit the requisite resources and adequately performing assigned mission tasks jointly. The
performance assessment function would also identify
best practices with strategic impact at the operational
level as well as hindrances to effective performance
that need to be addressed in the near term.
National Security Advisor Hadley recognized the
need for this assessment function and instituted an
implementing mechanism, Record 2008, managed by
a National Security Staff Directorate for Policy Implementation and Execution (PIE). Hadley describes how
he used Record 2008:
[W]e are now very focused on: once you have a policy, what is your strategy and plan for carrying out
that policy? What are the tasks? Who’s responsible
for each task? When are they due? And what is the
mechanism for tracking performance? . . . We have a
‘Stoplight Chart’ that says ‘Green: You’re on track’;
‘Yellow’: ‘You’re at risk of going off the track.’ And,
you know, ‘Red’: ‘You’re off track!’ If you’ve got a red
light on your implementation and execution chart, it
means that you need to get your interagency committee
back together, figure out what’s the problem and how
to fix it.114
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Regrettably, this effort to establish accountability of the interagency system was misinterpreted
by NSS Senior Directors and Directors as an assessment of personal performance, and was therefore
resisted and slow-rolled during the Bush administration and discarded, or at least shelved, by the Obama
administration.
Just as the Strategic Planning Directorate/Division must remain separate from the daily fray, so too
the policy and interagency system performance assessment function must be a routine function whose
objectivity is preserved, even as it is involved collaboratively in each national security mission area. This
function should be headed by a Deputy Assistant to
the President and Deputy National Security Advisor
for Interagency Policy Assessment, and the division
should have a degree of separation from the rest of the
NSS in order to preserve its objectivity and strategic
perspective, as opposed to a narrower issue perspective. At the same time, it must also be involved collaboratively in the other directorates’ work and having
other directorates participate as a matter of course in
its work.
NSS (as opposed to IPC) interagency and intergovernmental policy assessments and accountability should be institutionalized and scheduled on a
predictable basis to focus on six critical areas for the
President:
1. Testing the underlying assumptions of our national security strategy and interagency implementation plans;
2. Determining whether departments have committed the requisite resources and are performing the
ongoing mission tasks assigned to them by Staff/IPC-
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developed and presidentially-approved interagency
implementation strategies and plans;
3. Assessing whether mission objectives are being
accomplished and whether policies and interagency
implementation strategies and resource commitments
are appropriate for such objectives;
4. Assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of interagency activities that seek to accomplish objectives
and missions that involve the integration of expertise,
capabilities, or resources of multiple departments;
5. Assessing the role of the instruments of national
power in terms of current capabilities, and when there
are gaps, addressing the need for reallocation of resources, development of further capabilities, and improved organization. (“Instrument of national power”
refers to a national security function, sometimes summarized as “DIMEFIL+” [diplomacy, military, intelligence, economic, finance, information, law enforcement, plus others]). Each instrument of national power
is inherently an interagency/intergovernmental activity; for example, federal law enforcement spans at least
DOJ, DHS, Treasury, and JIATF-South at the federal
level, while the military instrument of national power
covers both DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) as well as
the state national guards and the industrial base; and,
6. Identifying and distributing the information on
best practices, lessons learned, and hindrances to effective and timely interagency policy implementation.
The new Assessments Division should produce
net assessments of policy and national security mission implementation that compare the relative positions, strengths, and weaknesses of the United States
and other global actors related to national security
missions.

80

The interagency/intergovernmental assessment
function is key to ensuring that information and
knowledge are treated as strategic assets and are
shared continuously among the national security community and across administrations. This strategic management function should produce assessments that
cover not just problems but also successes in activities
involving the expertise, capabilities, or resources of
multiple departments. These assessments should also
begin to form the doctrinal base for the management
of our national security system (how to think about
national security in the 21st century, not what to do)
and offer expertise on interagency performance and
assessment to the President, NSC and HSC, NSS, IPCs
and issue-specific interagency teams, and special envoys or czars. Importantly, these assessments should
be scheduled on a 12-month calendar of semi-annual
assessments for each IPC and other policy areas as appropriate and defined by the President or the National
Security Advisor.
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PART 6:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
However, work remains to foster coordination across
departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our
national security strategy, adapting the education and
training of national security professionals to equip
them to meet modern challenges, renewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs
that strengthen coordination.
		
		

The President’s National Security Strategy
May 2010115

This core role of the NSS as the strategic manager
of the national security system focuses on developing
an integrated interagency system beyond the NSS to
ensure that the system operates with maximum effectiveness and efficiency as a cohesive, learning, and
adaptive networked system rather than as a collection
of autonomous departments and agencies focused on
core competencies and often in conflict with each other. Key aspects of system development include human
capital, knowledge management, and an integrated
approach to long-term planning across the national
security system.
A National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan.
The President’s National Security Strategy of 2010
explicitly calls for “adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them
to meet modern challenges.” Numerous studies over
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the past 2 decades have pointed to the need for a professional national security corps in our government.
Hurricane Katrina, 9/11, and the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have provided additional emphasis on
the need for interagency and intergovernmental collaborative efforts and a more effective application of
all the elements of national power to national security
missions.116
The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has
led to significant initiatives to foster interagency cooperation and to improve agencies’ ability to carry
out “state building” initiatives more effectively. On
the military side, DoD Directive 3000.05, Directive on
Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, designated stability
operations as a core U.S. military mission requiring
systematic attention to doctrine, training, education,
exercises, and planning capabilities. It also clarified
DoD’s role in supporting civilian leadership in these
operations. On the civilian side, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative in 2004 and NSPD 44 (Management of
Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 7, 2005), established the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS [now a bureau]) and a new
civilian interagency Civilian Response Corps.117
On May 17, 2007, additional promising first steps
were undertaken by President Bush with the publication of Executive Order 14343 (National Security Professional Development), which provided legal authority for
an interagency national security professional development (NSPD) program.118 The establishment of the National Security Professional Development Integration
Office (NSPD-IO) funded by the DoD, publication of a
National Strategy for the Development of National Security
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Professionals, and an implementation plan that focused
on the three pillars of training, education, and rotational experience were completed by 2008. However,
the NSPD program did not allocate central resources
and left each agency and department to develop its
own national security professional capacity under the
very broad generic program guidelines. Not surprisingly, deep-seated departmental resistance (as with
PDD-56), a general lack of initiative, and an imputed
sense of uncertainty during and after the 2008 presidential election resulted in a self-declared “strategic
pause” as agencies and departments claimed they
were waiting for guidance on national security professional development from the new (Obama) administration. In early 2009, the new administration moved
the responsibility for the NSPD-IO from the DoD and
placed it under the Strategic Planning Directorate of
the National Security Staff, but there was little topdown guidance on the direction of the program, and
the “strategic pause” continued.
Congress, recognizing the loss of forward progress in this area, expressed its concern in legislative
language—Section 1054 of the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act—that required the President
to report to Congress on the status of national security professional development by December 1, 2010.
A NSS IPC and sub-IPC were established under the
Strategic Planning Directorate to oversee production
of the report, whose preparation was contracted to the
PNSR.119 The report recommended an independent office with a Senate-approved director who reported to
the national security advisor and an extensive training, education, interagency assignment, and fourstage credentialing program that would result in the
development over time of a corps of national security
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professionals steeped in the culture of interagency
collaboration, thus meeting the intent of President
Obama’s PSD-1 and the National Security Strategy. The
report was forwarded to Congress without comment
by the President. In the interim, while the S/CRS was
being elevated from office to bureau status in the State
Department as a result of the State/USAID QDDR,
plans for the Civilian Response Corps were scaled
back dramatically and the NSPD-IO was moved from
the Strategic Planning Directorate to the Resiliency Directorate of the National Security Staff to be managed
as a small pilot program known as NSPD 2.0. While
retaining the authority of Executive Order 14343, the
new focus of the NSPD 2.0 is on preparing personnel
to accomplish specific missions in emergency management rather than on the broader scope and intent
of the executive order to foster an ability to collaborate
across the broad spectrum of potential national security concerns. In 2011, Congress again attempted to
provide an impetus for forward progress, with separate national security professional development bills
focused on the original broad scope of Executive Order 14343 being introduced in both the House and the
Senate.120 However, those bills did not become law, in
part because of opposition from the departments and
agencies.
The President’s National Security Strategic Human
Capital Plan should be aligned with all superior national security strategy documents and in turn serve
as the overarching guidance document for the national security human capital plans and systems of all
national security departments and agencies. The plan
should be updated at least biennially and would include requirements, goals, timetables, and metrics for
the national security human capital system, including:
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•	
Strategic national security human capital management: Competency analysis, work force analysis, mission-critical occupation analysis, and
sourcing assessments (military, federal-statelocal, civilian, contractor, and other).
•	
Talent acquisition and management: Recruitment,
training, distribution, assignments, incentives,
performance management, credentialing and
promotions, succession, and transition programs, and the resources, support, and flexibilities needed to meet requirements.
•	
Leadership development and collaborative interagency culture: Standards for education and
training programs, developmental and rotational assignments, community and career path
development (including a national security
professional executive corps), diversity, motivational values, and a results-oriented culture
of continuous improvement.
•	
Centralized management of the NSPD program:
A dedicated national security human capital
integration, assessment, and oversight office
outside of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management with a senate-confirmed director reporting through the national security advisor
and NSS and linked to counterparts across
government.
Knowledge Management: Knowledge and
Intellectual Capital (KIC).
Vint Cerf, one of the fathers of the Internet, has
noted: “Information isn’t power, information sharing
is power.”121 Knowledge and intellectual capital are
strategic assets and must be treated as such. Rooted
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in data and information, KIC adds context and experience, enabling far higher levels of understanding and
networked connectivity. Accessing information, sharing knowledge, and collaboration among partners are
critical to success. These functions are at the heart of
the assessment-decision-action paradigm of the NSS
strategic system management role outlined earlier in
this monograph. KIC seeks to ensure that “what an
organization knows” can be captured, leveraged, and
extended for the benefit of all members of our national
security community.
System-wide situational awareness at the strategic
level is a fundamental requirement of the national security system of the 21st century just as it is on today’s
network-centric battlefield. Much of the government’s
situational awareness is provided by the 24/7 news
media and the thoughtful input of think tanks, opinion
leaders, and commentators. However, as noted earlier, our national security system is currently organized
as a vertical, rules-based system—much like the vertically integrated corporations of the 20th century and
grounded in a Cold War belief that events are linear.
That system is ill-suited for successful management
of policies that address 21st century issues that are
interactive, complex systems of systems, constantly
changing. As a result, the national security system is
characterized by systemic inefficiency, long lead times
for decisions, lack of foresight, missed opportunities
for shaping events as they unfold progressively faster
than our ability to respond, stifled information flow,
disjointed strategic planning and operations, endemic
agency focus on survival, turf, and budget maximization, and continuity of familiar procedures.122
The ultimate objective of strategic management of
the national security system is to make better national

88

security decisions faster and take decisive action sooner. The challenge of internal information and knowledge sharing plagues most organizations; the flow
among and between organizations and entities is even
more problematic. Moreover, the ability to do so at the
strategic national security system level is practically
nonexistent, both because of agency cultures and lack
of compatible information technology (IT) systems. As
our national security challenges become more complex, involve an ever-increasing array of networked
partners, and take place within compressed timelines,
the real-time flow of networked national security information and knowledge becomes more critical. To meet the
national security needs of the 21st century, we must
be able to share data, information, and knowledge on
a real-time basis within the NSS, across the federal interagency, with other government partners (state, local, and tribal), and with nontraditional partners, both
anticipated and unanticipated.
Today, there are two opportunities that will greatly improve the flow of knowledge, information, and
intellectual capital: the incorporation of collaboration
tools and the movement to an information and knowledge-sharing networked culture, particularly among
the younger cohorts of government employees. Of the
two, motivating people and organizations to behave
as stewards of information rather than “owners” is the
greater challenge.
A national security knowledge management integration and analysis capability is key to both the strategy and assessment system management functions
and must be established within the NSS and throughout the national security community writ large. This
function would support the advisory role of the NSC
and HSC as they assist the President by empowering
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the NSS to anticipate, develop strategy, monitor extant
and developing situations, and manage crises as they
unfold. Specifically, the KIC integration and analysis
function would have four principal objectives:
1. Facilitate national security studies (past, present,
and future) in support of and with the collaboration of
all mission partners, but first and foremost the NSS;
2. Orchestrate development and maintenance of
the national security knowledge base, enabling access and discovery of relevant information and data
to support the national security system;
3. Promote information and knowledge sharing in
support of national security analysis and integration,
reinforcing the notion that “information sharing is
real power;” and,
4. Establish counterparts to this function throughout the departments and agencies that play a routine
role, as well as those playing an occasional role, in national security. Networked liaisons would encourage
contact and collaboration to illuminate organizational
knowledge and information holdings, direct inquiries,
facilitate timely information exchange, and support
national security efforts with specific expertise.
In sum, national security system knowledge management by the NSS through access, sharing, and collaboration must become the new watchwords for the
U.S. national security community.
Ensure an Integrated Approach to Planning across
the Interagency System.
“Plans are nothing, but planning is everything,”
[President] Eisenhower used to say, quoting Prussian
General Helmuth von Moltke. “The secret of a sound,
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satisfactory decision made on an emergency basis,”
Ike continued, “has always been that the responsible
official has been ‘living with the problem’ before it becomes acute.”123 Yet in our national security system,
with the exception of the DoD, long-term planning—
with a 5- to 6-year time horizon—is largely nonexistent. However, as the Independent Commission on
the QDR pointed out in its review of the last QDR,
DoD 6-year planning and programming as part of the
Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) process does
little to anticipate events or problems over the period
of the FYDP that might challenge the assumptions of
the status quo. Rather, the department plans shortterm, operates from the top down, thinks within existing parameters, and affirms the correctness of existing
plans and programs of record.124 Although the other
departments and agencies have strategy and policy
planning units, these units are narrowly focused on
departmental perspectives, traditional core functions,
and short-term resource needs. With rare exceptions,
this department level planning, while possibly “strategic” for the department, is focused on a 1- to 2-year
time horizon and takes place in a vacuum or is informed by quadrennial reviews that may or may not
be informed adequately by the President’s national
security strategy. Moreover, the interagency planning
that does take place is issue-specific, and plan development, format, terminology, and approval are not
consistent across issue areas.
Robust interagency operational and strategic planning capabilities outside the NSS are needed in order
to flesh out options for senior leader consideration
and to develop integrated implementation plans once
the President’s policies and strategy are set. As noted
earlier, for the last 4 years the NSC has used the Na-
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tional Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (NCTC/DSOP) for planning and assessments of interagency counterterrorism
activities. However, despite efforts to better resource
it, DSOP’s capacity is not what it should be, nor is it
obvious that it is scalable to the broader interagency
domain. Recent quadrennial reviews have charged
other major departments (State, DHS, and the intelligence community [IC]) to establish such processes
and extended planning and resource horizons. Uniform, robust, integrated interagency national (federal,
state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and NGO)
planning capabilities must be further developed with
5- to 6-year planning horizons, and at the federal level
planning cells must be better utilized outside the EOP.
Maintaining minimum standards for planning
processes and products is imperative for ensuring
that unity of effort is achieved. The current department and agency cultural and congressional oversight
barriers to interagency collaboration and planning in
the NCTC/DSOP and S/CRS-developed Interagency
Management System (IMS) efforts currently underway must be rigorously overcome. Designing effective
standing national interagency planning systems that
take into account all instruments of national power,
and that report to the President through the NSS and
NSC, is critical.
Establishing the Steady State for Development
of the National Security System.
The development of national security human capital, knowledge management, and long-term planning
are all enablers of the national security system and
enduring functions that should bridge across admin-
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istrations. They are “policy neutral” and key to the
long-term functioning of the national security system.
Thus, they, like strategy development and implementation assessment, must be “fenced off” from the
day-to-day NSS focus on crisis management and staffing the President. At the same time, staffing for these
enablers requires “standing” with the President. This
is probably best done by creating the position of Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security
Advisor for National Security System Development,
who would report through the national security advisor to the President on a semi-annual basis.
President Obama’s consolidation of the staffs and
executive secretariats of the NSC and the Homeland
Security Council was a welcome step. Currently, the
Executive Secretariat manages the NSC system and
processes to ensure that the trains “run on time.” In
addition to this role, the executive secretary, appointed by the President, should also provide oversight for
the strategic human capital plan, knowledge management, and long-term planning, within the NSS.
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PART 7:
STRATEGIC CHOICE:
RESOURCING THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFF TO PERFORM
THE STRATEGIC SYSTEM MANAGEMENT ROLE
I thought that President Clinton made a terrible mistake in proclaiming that he was going to cut the size
of the staff. . . . I include cutting the NSC staff as a
mistake because people work so hard there that you
fry them after a while if you don’t have a staff of sufficient size.
		

		

Former National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake125

Presidents traditionally begin their terms by ostentatiously down-sizing the NSS, only to silently increase its later on, if only to deal with the demands
of crisis response and staffing their own offices. They
have also increased staff size to deal with new functional areas of responsibility. President Clinton, recognizing the increasing importance of the economy,
created the NEC in 1993 to coordinate policymaking
for domestic and international economic issues, with
the deputy dual-hatted as a Deputy National Security
Advisor for International Economic Affairs. President
Bush expanded on the NSC portfolio in international
economic affairs by adding homeland security with
the creation of the Homeland Security Council, which
was later enshrined in statute in 2004. Presidents have
added and eliminated transnational and functional
directorates over time as their visions of our national
security interests have changed. However, since 1991,
the size of the NSS—or least the allocation of staff
effort to the strategic system management tasks out-
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lined herein—has not been and is not now adequate
for the needs of the national security system. The flexibility that Presidents do have to change the size of
the NSS is shown in Figures 5 and 6. This flexibility
presents opportunities for major changes by unilateral executive action without legislative action. System
management of the national security system is a constant that should span presidential administrations.
Improvements in the system management of our national security system should not be discarded based
on “anything but that of my predecessor” or in this era
of austere resources, “I’m going to prove how frugal I
am.” Both maxims are usually disproved as a new administration gets into the business of governing rather
than campaigning for the presidency.

Sources: Brookings Institution National Security Council Project126 and White House Budget Submissions.

Figure 5. NSC/NSS Professional Staff, 1960-2011.
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FTE
Budget
($ million)

FY09
Actual

FY 10
Actual

FY 11
CR Requested

FY 12
Requested

FY13
Requested

NSC

NSC/HSC

NSC/HSC

NSC/HSC

NSC/HSC

57

71

86

86

77

8,994

14,787

12,917

13,074

13,048

Figure 6. National Security Staff Professional Staff
Size in Obama Administration.127
The NSC staff (now the NSS) has historically remained very small relative to needed system management functions at the strategic level. In 1939, FDR’s
Brownlow Commission report on the burdens of presidential management of government affairs, which
led to the establishment of the Executive Office of the
President, pointed out that “[the] formal march of
history depends more on effective management than
upon any other single factor . . . and the President of
the United States, managing the biggest business in
the world, now has less assistance . . . than many State
Governors, city managers and mayors, and executives
of even small private concerns.”128 In terms that sound
very similar, the 9/11 Commission noted with regard
to the NSC staff:
Even as it crowds into every square inch of available
office space, the NSC staff is still not sized or funded
to be an executive agency. . . . Yet a subtler and more
serious danger is that as the NSC staff is consumed by
these day-to-day tasks, it has less capacity to find the
time and detachment needed to advise a president on
larger policy issues.129
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The NSS is insanely small for the biggest, most
complicated, and most important enterprise on earth.
As a result of insufficient staff levels, it has very limited capacity to deal with a wide range of long-term
or strategic issues, and, by default, can do policy formulation only in the boundaries of its allotted time,
meanwhile jumping from crisis to crisis and the daily
inbox as driven by the 24–hour news cycle.130 Worse,
the doers are often a pickup team of political advisors
rather than security professionals with long experience. Many of the players are temporary hires or seconded from the departments and agencies who know
they are going back in a future day, making it hard for
them not to overweight their home agency’s special
interests. Small staff size tends to reinforce the traditional policy-based culture of the NSS, undermining
the broader long-range planning role as intended by
PPD-1, the Jones Memo, and PSD-1. Former National
Security Advisor General James Jones made the point
more directly: “The White House National Security
Council is ill-organized to prepare for the future. The
NSC staff is geared to respond to the crisis of the day.
You wind up becoming more tactical instead of strategic.”131 Recent events on the Korean Peninsula and in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and the Middle East, as
well as the U.S. response to the Japanese earthquake
and tsunami, only reinforce this concern. After the
fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, experts on the
NSS were asked whether the U.S. Government had
contingency plans in case the Mubarak regime were
to collapse. NSC officials had to admit they did not.132
Strategic surprise followed by “rediscovery learning”
during crisis management continues to dominate the
culture of the national security system and the NSS.
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We must get beyond the traditional qualms about
a larger staff size often used to explain a skeleton
NSS, a qualm that was explicitly incorporated into
the decision memo for PSD-1—“This recommendation requires no additional resources.” We must step
up to the strategic choice to resource the NSS (and
by extension OMB) to perform the strategic management of our national security system required of a
superpower.
Reform of the current national security system
would imply some different ways of doing the same
tasks that it and the NSS perform now—policy, crisis response, and staffing the President. But doing the
same things differently may also confine the system to
the sins of the past and ignore the realities of the global security environment in the 21st century. The President’s national security strategy calls for transformation of
the national security system—and by extension—transformation of the roles and strategic system management functions of the NSS. The Staff must do different things in
addition to adopting new ways of doing those things
that it currently does—specifically strategic management and development of the national security system
for the presidency across administrations. Emphasis
on foresight and strategic thinking that goes beyond
the short-term promises of political campaigns is essential. Presidential guidance for planning; resources
based on 6-year timelines and resource profiles; alignment of departmental and agency resources with strategic missions; and oversight of policy implementation
and accountability, are the new system management
tasks that must be performed by the NSS. Additionally, the Staff must embrace long-term development
of the national security system through a focus on
human capital, knowledge management, and devel-
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opment of a government-wide long-term planning
capacity as critical enablers of this strategic system
management function.
Agreement on the assessment and assignment of the
strategic management role and functions we expect from the
NSS is the first critical step in defining the staff organization, the personnel requirements for the staff, and
the staff processes to advise and assist the President
in integrating the interagency and intergovernmental
efforts on a whole-of-government/nation basis at the
strategic level. This analysis does not intend to suggest
that the strategic management functions in the interagency space between the EOP and the departments
and agencies outlined in this monograph require a
super-department that would preempt the statutory
authorities and prerogatives of cabinet officers. It does
suggest that meeting the statutory requirements of
the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President in the complex environment of the 21st century
through strategic management of the national security
system requires that the NSS (and by extension OMB)
be sufficiently and effectively resourced to perform
these system management and advisory functions.
Former National Security Advisor James Jones, in
informal conversations in January 2010 and later at a
workshop on the NSS hosted by the Strategic Studies
Institute of the U.S. Army War College in September
2011, estimated that 75-90 additional NSS professionals, as well as additional staff to perform the OMB management function, would be needed to institutionalize
the role of the national security advisor and the NSS as
the strategic managers of the national security system
for the President. He called for an “agency-like” organization to perform the strategic management and
development functions (outlined herein) composed of
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70 percent national security professionals to provide
for transition across presidential administrations and
30 percent political appointees.133
In organizational design, form should follow function.
An objective assessment of additional resources and
staff required for the NSS and OMB to perform the
“whole-of-government/nation “ strategy development, resource alignment, implementation oversight,
and interagency assessment functions to support and
sustain the departmental quadrennial reviews should
be conducted with the help of outside management
experts as soon as possible. As noted earlier, the addition of Deputy Assistants to the President/Deputy
Assistants National Security Advisors for Strategy,
Interagency Assessment, and Interagency System Development would provide the robustness required for
the NSS to manage both the national security system
and the enablers required to support it in the long
term (human capital, knowledge management, and
long-term planning). The White House should work
with Congress to provide for transparency and the
additional funding and manpower to ensure effective
strategic management of the national security system
in the interagency space. Even a doubling of the size
of the new combined NSS, given the nature of the
work expected at the strategic level, is a very reasonable price for the “whole-of-government” coherency
and consistency in managing the increased number
of actors—state and nonstate—and the exceedingly
complex national security issues and challenges of the
21st century.
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PART 8:
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP:
FIXING THE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE PAST
To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate
all of the tools of American power. . . . This requires
close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and
inclusive interagency process so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations,
policies and strategies.
		National Security Strategy, May 2010

The problems of our national security system are
deeply rooted in its structures: the constitutional invitation to conflict between the executive and the
legislative branches of government; the hierarchical
and functional divisions of departments; and the extraordinarily cumbersome and layered procedures
such as budgeting through which decisions are channeled. Many of the proposed changes to align the NSS
with its system management and development roles
outlined earlier can be done administratively and unilaterally by the President through executive orders,
PPDs, and PSDs. However, none of the 1947-89 legacy
system defects can be truly remedied without changes
in law that will provide the requisite assurances that
the system management and development changes
will endure across administrations.
The Cold War required a “national security state”
with large military forces along with engaged diplomacy focused on the issues of national existence and
military interventions in proxy wars. Now the problem
is understanding and acting upon a radically changed
security environment. Does it require such a state or
do all of the new national security challenges and op-
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portunities demand new mechanisms? Over the last
65 years—under Presidents Harry S Truman (NSC68 and containment of the Soviet Union), Dwight D.
Eisenhower (getting things right early in the Cold
War), Richard M. Nixon (rebalancing relationships
with the Soviet Union and China), and George H. W.
Bush (managing the first Gulf War and German reunification)—the NSC and the national security system134
have well served the President and the nation. Each
of these major achievements was undertaken with
a strong sense of strategic cooperation between the
President and Congress.
The question today is whether the NSC supported
by the NSS in its roles as strategic manager and developer of the national security system can get the big
things right and assist and advise the President in a rational discourse and strategic collaboration with Congress. Given the supreme importance of national security, the answer to that question is not preordained. A
radically changed global security environment poses
vastly different and more complex challenges and opportunities. These openings increasingly require new
mechanisms, organizations, and processes.
Concerns about the misalignment of organizational arrangements and demands of the 21st century are
not new. The Hart-Rudman Commission on National
Security (1998), the 9/11 Commission Report (2004),
and the PNSR report, Forging a New Shield (2008),
and numerous other studies have urged a dramatic
overhaul of our national security system. Critics, Congress, and the cognoscenti, in one report or another,
have called for both a new grand strategy and all of
the system management functions and enabling capabilities outlined in this monograph.135 The question of
where to locate this critical system management role
boils down to a simple question: If not the NSS with
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its enduring roles of crisis management and staffing
the President, then where? If somewhere else, how do
we maintain the momentum toward transformation of
the national security system to support the President
in his Article II powers?
In 1950, NSC-68 had the intellectual punch to unite
the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government in the execution of the grand strategy
of containment of the Soviet Union as proposed by
George Kennan. Public officials led by Paul Nitze,
director of the Policy Planning Office at the State Department, did the hard strategy work, operationalizing Kennan’s intellectual foundations through strategic decisions on resources and the elements of our
national power. President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium focused on competitive strategies and resource
constraints, further confirming the ways in which the
national security system would implement the national strategy of containment. This grand strategy
was simple, readily understood across government,
and amenable to execution. “The United States will
contain the Soviet Union by forming strong alliances,
assuring allies that we will stand by them, and maintaining sufficient military and nuclear dominance to
deter Soviet aggression.”136 The existential threat to
the nation’s security and physical existence as posed
by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact endured across
eight administrations, providing a basis for bipartisan
continuity of effort until the end of the Cold War. Today, we have only begun to discuss a strategic narrative that would address fundamental questions about
the nature of America’s power and national purposes and how to marry that power to purpose in a
changing world.137
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The current national security system needs to be
transformed to one that is truly managed as a system of systems in both the executive and legislative
branches of government. Even though this transformation would not preclude the recent proliferation of
“Black Swan” events, it would institutionalize system
management, enable foresight at the strategic level,
and provide the President with the ability to get beyond campaign promises to think about and respond
better to the slow-moving but inexorable challenges
that are obvious, but perhaps politically inconvenient
to acknowledge and act upon. Such challenges are exemplified by the housing crisis and our economic situation that developed over the course of three presidencies; loss of strategic competitiveness in education
(science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
[STEM]); infrastructure, technology, and manufacturing; resource competition; and climate change. These
challenges led both the Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen to declare in
2009 that the greatest threat to our national security
was the economy, not traditional military threats that
had shaped our national security system since 1947.
Equally important, given a true national security
strategy based on ends, ways, and means, a strategically managed national security system could assist
the President in addressing strategic choices. These
would include giving up some older priorities and
structures based on new tradeoffs and “foreseeing”
what will be important rather than the Black Swans
that will surprise us. Do we need to keep military bases in Europe? Borrow billions from the Chinese for a
military to contain China with our “strategic pivot” to
Asia and the Pacific? Continue our old approaches to
foreign aid and development?
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In the National Security Strategy of May 2010, the
Obama administration called for a transformed national security system based on a whole-of-government approach. In response, Congress required the
President to submit an implementation plan for the
organizational goals of the strategy. Section 1072 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 mandates (see full text of Section 1072 in
Appendix I):
Not less than 270 days after the enactment of this Act,
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation plan for achieving the whole-of-government integration vision prescribed in the President’s National Security Strategy
of May 2010. This implementation plan shall include-(1) a description of ongoing and future actions
planned to be taken by the President and the Executive agencies to implement organizational changes,
programs, and any other efforts to achieve each component of the whole-of-government vision prescribed
in the National Security Strategy;
(2) a timeline for specific actions taken and planned
to be taken by the President and the Executive agencies to implement each component of the whole-ofgovernment vision prescribed in the National Security
Strategy;
(3) an outline of specific actions desired or required
to be taken by Congress to achieve each component of
the whole-of-government vision prescribed in the National Security Strategy, including suggested timing
and sequencing of actions proposed for Congress and
the Executive agencies.138

This congressionally mandated report offers the
same chance for the executive and the legislative
branches to come together as they did with the Eberstat Report and the Congressional Reorganization Act
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of 1946. However, rather than focusing on fixing the
past as was done in the National Security Act of 1947,
the focus should be on how to fix the future and embark on a forward-looking, functional executive-legislative strategic partnership that will guarantee our
nation’s security and well-being far into the future.
In today’s bitterly partisan atmosphere, unilateral
actions by the President to transform the national security system are viewed as admissions of weakness,
or perhaps failure. Yet the opportunity to do the right
thing and get the big things right in cooperation with
Congress—the signal accomplishment of a secondterm President—is both unprecedented and fleeting.
The congressionally mandated Section 1072 report—
due just 1 month before the presidential election—presented a unique opportunity for creating a strategic
framework to address these fundamental national security issues and establishing a collaborative dialogue
and partnership with the Congress. President Obama
has clearly identified the role of the NSC/NSS to be
strategic managers of the national security system in
the two organizational documents he has issued so
far—PDD-1 (Organization of the National Security System) and the PSD-1 (Organizing for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism). His National Security Strategy of
May 2010 not only reinforces this focus on transformed
strategic system management by the national security
advisor and the NSS, but specifically calls for implementation of these functions as well as a very prominent identification of the need for a corps of national
security professionals across the federal government.
Our current “Pearl Harbor legacy” national security system in both the executive and legislative
branches strongly reinforces the old adage of “being
able to describe every tree in the forest, but unable to
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describe the forest itself.” Congressional oversight for
national security issues has expanded well beyond
that foreseen in the 1946 realignment of congressional
oversight under the armed services and foreign affairs
committees. At least six Senate and seven House committees have jurisdiction over some aspect of national
security. The complex global security environment
today demands that congressional oversight be strategic, holistically based, and focused on achieving the
goals of national security strategy. This requires strategic system management of national security missions
as reinforced by strategically oriented congressional
oversight of integrated, interagency budgets and assessment of policy outcomes rather than the current
myopic focus on traditional agency competencies
and programs.
This strategic system management and development of the national security system in the executive
branch can be done within the intent of the language of
the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) regarding the advisory role of the NSC. However, continuing to utilize an understaffed and overworked NSS in
order to “stay below the horizon” of congressional interest and oversight perpetuates the executive branch
dysfunctions of the current legacy national security
system at great risk to the nation. It also conveniently
ignores the fact that within the Executive Office of
the President, the Director of OMB and two deputies are confirmed by the Senate and routinely testify
before Congress.
In fact, the national security advisor spends considerable time meeting with legislators and congressional staffs as well as the news media that affect the
President’s domestic standing. The national security
advisor must work alongside other executive branch

109

officials to build trust with Congress in order to facilitate cooperation between the two branches to achieve
the administration’s national security objectives.139
Formalizing the role of the national security advisor
and properly resourcing the NSS as the strategic managers of the national security system through executive
order, budgetary processes, and ultimately revision
of congressional oversight are strategic imperatives
whose time has come if we are to meet the President’s
goal of “winning the future” with a government of the
future that the President called for in his 2011 State of
the Union address.
The first “Section 1072 Report to the Congress”
should outline the President’s intent to staff for and
perform the strategic system management functions
of policy, strategy, planning and resource guidance,
alignment of resources with national security missions, oversight of implementation, and assessment as
an integral part of his Article II responsibilities. The report should explicitly describe the additional resource
requirements for the NSS to properly perform these
strategic system management tasks and include those
requirements in the budget for FY 2014. Additionally,
the report should address the problem of continuity
across administrations—of having a full complement
of national security professionals to provide strategic
management of the NSC national security processes
and the need to put together a fully functioning interagency national security team as quickly as possible,
with particular focus on the confirmation of key assistant secretaries who populate the IPC level and do the
critical first level work.
Additionally, the Section 1072 Report should focus
on the need for integrated national security budgets
with 6-year resource and planning profiles as an exten-
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sion of the GPRAMA of 2010 and provide such budgets
in several selected national security mission areas beyond that already provided for in the Global Security
Fund established by the Departments of State and Defense in the FY 2012 budget. In this regard, the problem
of the fungibility of funds—the “color of money”—that
are inherent in integrated national security budgets
must be addressed. The President should request that
both houses of Congress review these integrated national security mission budgets through joint or select
national security oversight committees rather than the
currently constituted congressional committees that
exercise oversight over the stovepiped departments
and agencies. One need only look at the DHS and the
current congressional oversight system of 88 separate
subcommittees—a legacy system based on where the
many components of the department were located in
the executive branch 10 years ago rather than the five
integrated mission areas defined in the QHSR/Bottom-Up Review of the department today. This fragmented oversight is within each current stovepipe!
“Death by a thousand cuts” is probably not too far
from describing the piecemeal approach to oversight
of not only DHS, but the many other departments and
agencies with equities in national security missions,
many of them with overlapping and legacy programs
that have outlived their usefulness. Holistic oversight
of integrated interagency national security missions is
totally lacking. New executive branch strategic system
management of our national security system would,
in fact, greatly improve Congress’s ability to provide
responsible oversight.
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The initial Section 1072 Report should also address
the problem of sequencing national security documents mandated by statute today—the national security strategy, departmental quadrennial reviews, annual budgets, and reports to Congress—so that there
is a logic and progressive path that forces the production of a true ends, ways, and means-based national
security strategy, strategic choices about what we as
a nation will and won’t do, alignment of resources
(ways and means) with national security missions, and
assessment of outcomes. In many ways, this is analogous to the transformation of the DoD and the military services since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, where
the warfighters become the combatant commanders of
joint forces and the services and service chiefs become
force providers. In the same way, the departments
and agencies must also come to view themselves as
“capability providers” to larger integrated national
security missions.
As a part of the Section 1072 report, the President
should also submit to Congress his plan and resource
needs for fulfilling the promise to adapt and provide
the training and education for national security professionals to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
This plan should include the rationale for departing
from Executive Order 14343 and its broad systembased approach and the recommendations of the
Section 1054 Study required by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2010 to the current NSPD 2.0
that is focused on a very narrow range of emergency
management tasks. This is especially important as we
face a “sea change” in the federal bureaucracy with
the retirement of a large percentage of the workforce
over the next decade—and with this change, we
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will gain the opportunity to recruit, train, and educate a network-based corps of true national security
professionals.
The national security system should not be an adversarial process or game of “gotcha”—either between
the executive and the legislative branches or within
and among the stove-piped departments and agencies
bound to and protected by their congressional patrons.
Both branches must realize that we are saddled with
a legacy national security system designed to avoid
the failure at Pearl Harbor. It allowed us to muddle
through the Cold War, but it is both inappropriate and
irrelevant for today’s national security challenges. The
President has clearly stated that the national security
system must be transformed if the nation is to remain
a relevant, effective global leader in the 21st century.
The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended in
1949) attempted to fix the problems of the past in the
hope that the security arrangement required in the future would be sufficiently similar for the fixes to have
value. Lacking a real debate, the post-Cold War fixes
to the national security system resulted in the fourtiered NSC system that once again fixed the system’s
past defects. What followed the Cold War, 9/11, and
the economic crisis of 2008 is more discontinuous than
the change after World War II. That does not explain
why we have avoided this debate at the highest levels,
but it does suggest that the same retroactive approach
to “fixing” our national security system would be a
mistake. In that regard, the CSIS 2012 Global Forecast:
Risk Opportunity and the Next Administration notes
that the contraction of resources at home and the rising volatility and complexity of challenges overseas,
while not necessarily equating to American decline,
does mean added risk: “Every senior national secu-
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rity leader in Washington is struggling with how to
allocate shrinking resources on hand to address an
expanding problem set.”140
We are, as we were in 1946-47, faced with a strategic choice on to how to allocate resources and control our destiny. The President’s National Security
Strategy properly describes the future and recognizes
the role that Congress must play in providing answers. Through Section 1072, Congress has accepted
the President’s invitation to parley and fix the future
rather than the past. The President’s response to the
reporting requirements of Section 1072 of the 2012
National Defense Authorization Act—to include what
Congress can and should do as a committed strategic
partner in a historic joint venture—can and should be
the first step to true transformation of the national security system and meeting the intent of the President’s
National Security Strategy to preserve our national security and prosperity in the 21st century.
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APPENDIX I
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT OF FY 2012:
SEC. 1072. REPORT ON PLAN
TO IMPLEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS
RECOMMENDED IN THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY-2010
(a) Findings. Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) An urgent need exists to transform the
United States national security system in order to employ all elements of national power effectively and
efficiently to meet the challenges of the 21st century
security environment.
(2) The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel emphasized this need in its July 2010
report, writing that `the Panel notes with extreme
concern that our current Federal Government structures--both executive and legislative, and in particular
those related to security--were fashioned in the 1940s
and, at best, they work imperfectly today. . . . A new
approach is needed’.
(3) The National Security Strategy-May 2010
calls for such a transformation of the U.S. national
security system through its identification of organizational changes already underway, its recommendation of additional organizational changes to be undertaken, and its commitment to strengthening national
capacity through a whole-of-government approach.
(4) The realization of these organizational goals
can best be assured by the preparation of a report by
the President on progress being made on organizational changes already underway and on an imple-
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mentation plan for the organizational changes newly
recommended in the National Security Strategy.
(b) Plan
To
Implement
Recommendations
Required:
(1) IN GENERAL - Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth a plan to implement the
organizational goals recommended in the National
Security Strategy-May 2010.
(2) ELEMENTS - The report required under this
subsection shall include the following:
(A) A progress report identifying each organizational change identified by the National Security
Strategy as already underway, including for each such
change the following:
(i) The goal such organizational change
seeks to achieve.
		
(ii)The actions required of the Executive
Branch to achieve such goal.
		
(iii) The actions required of Congress to
achieve such goal.
		
(iv) The preferred sequencing of the executive and legislative actions specified under clauses (ii) and (iii).
		
(v) The preferred timetable for such
executive and legislative actions and
for achievement of such goal.
		
(vi) The progress that has already been
achieved toward such goal, and the
obstacles that have been encountered.
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(B) An implementation plan addressing each
organizational change newly recommended by the
National Security Strategy, including for each such
change the following:
(i) The goal each organizational change
seeks to achieve.
		
(ii) The actions required of the Executive
Branch to achieve such goal.
		
(iii) The actions of Congress required to
achieve such goal.
		
(iv) The preferred sequencing of the executive and legislative actions specified under clauses
(ii) and (iii).
		
(v) The preferred timetable for such
executive and legislative actions for achievement of
such goal.
(c) Annual Update—Not later than December 1 in
each year following the year in which the report required by subsection (b) is submitted, the president
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an update of the report setting forth a description of the following:
(1) The progress made in achieving each organizational goal covered by the report required in subsection (b).
(2) The modifications necessary to the plan required by subsection (b) in light of the experience of
the Executive Branch in implementing the plan.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined—In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means –
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Homeland
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Security and Government Affairs, Committee on the
Budget, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on
Appropriations, and Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Homeland
Security, Committee on the Budget, Committee on the
Judiciary, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Committee on Appropriations, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
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APPENDIX II

THE STATE DEPARTMENT/USAID
QUADRENNIAL DIPLOMACY
AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (QDDR)
AND PSD-7
This long-awaited Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and its companion piece, the decision
memorandum for PSD-7 (Presidential Study Directive
on Global Development) were released in September,
2010, well after the National Security Strategy and with
sufficient time to be fully informed by the president’s
strategy. Unlike any of the preceding departmental
strategies or quadrennial reviews, the QDDR is replete
with references to the National Security Strategy, the
interagency, whole-of-government, and the role of the
National Security Staff as the driver and integrator for
diplomacy and development, and more generally, the
elements of “civilian power” in the national security
system. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton notes:
The QDDR is not simply a review. It defines how
to make diplomacy and development coordinated,
complementary, and mutually reinforcing. It assesses
what has worked in the past and what has not. And it
forecasts future strategic choices and resource needs. .
. . But diplomacy and development can only be mutually reinforcing if the U.S. government gets its house in
order. The first step is to move beyond agency “stovepiping” and use all the talent and expertise within the
federal government.

The QDDR’s repeated reference to the State/USAID relationship to the National Security Staff is especially relevant in terms of strategic management of the
national security system as detailed below:
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•	Under the guidance of the National Security
Staff, the State Department will lead for operations responding to political and security crises, while USAID will lead for operations in
response to humanitarian crises resulting from
large-scale natural or industrial disasters, famines, disease outbreaks, and other natural phenomena (p. 20).
•	Work with the National Security Staff and our
interagency partners toward a national security
budgeting process that would allow policymakers and lawmakers to see the whole of our
national security priorities (p. 25).
•	It is now up to State and USAID to work with
the National Security Staff and other civilian
U.S. Government agencies to develop an effective civilian capability to promote short-term
stabilization, sustainable peace, and development (p. 125).
•	The National Security Staff provides overall
policy leadership and coordinates the interagency in responding to major crises. In all crises, it is critical to refine the division of labor
between State and USAID to increase operational effectiveness. Going forward, State and
USAID will adopt a lead agency approach to
guide our own operations (p. 157).
•	In Washington, State and USAID will work
closely with the National Security Staff and
other federal agency partners to ensure unified
interagency guidance, planning, and execution.
In situations that call for a joint civil-military
approach, State and USAID will coordinate
with the Department of Defense. Our approach
does not diminish the unique capabilities of
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either agency, but seeks to more precisely differentiate responsibilities, align mandates, and
clarify roles (p. 159).
•	State and USAID will coordinate with interagency partners, through the National Security
Staff-led process, to develop an International
Operational Response Framework that establishes the systems and procedures necessary to
ensure transparent and accountable leadership
structures and agency lines of responsibility
which, when combined, will leverage and deliver the full range of U.S. international disaster, crisis, and conflict response resources (p.
165).
•	Guided by the National Security Staff-led Review of Security Sector Assistance, the QDDR
examined how State and USAID could become
more effective at providing security and justice assistance. Our overall approach needs to
be comprehensive—integrating military assistance, police and internal security, and rule
of law programs—and sustained to achieve
results. To be effective, we must prioritize and
select our partners, ensure that security sector
assistance promotes responsible democratic
governance, and improve coordination within
State and USAID as well as across the interagency to promote unity of effort (p. 178).
•	The National Security Staff-led interagency
review of Security Sector Assistance will provide policy guidance for a U.S. Government approach to security and justice assistance. Under
the guidance of the President, State and USAID
will work together with the National Security
Staff (p. 180).
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•	
Develop a common strategic framework and operational guidance. Working with other agencies,
we will develop a common security and justice
sector reform framework, consistent with the
ultimate findings of the National Security Staffled Security Sector Assistance Review, that describes U.S. objectives and priorities, and interagency roles and responsibilities (p. 181).
The QDDR takes on the fundamental task of defining a State/USAID vision, mission, and core capabilities to implement the objectives laid out in the
President’s National Security Strategy. Importantly, a
performance-based management philosophy for management at the strategic level in the State Department/
USAID is embedded in the QDDR, and organizational
structure, process, and cultural changes are identified
for implementation. Interestingly, the department has
turned to the private sector that long ago abandoned
strict hierarchical organization for performance-based
management through flat organization and crossfunctional teams for guidance and inspiration. The
Study—Managing 21st Century Diplomacy: Lessons from
Global Corporations—was done by Dr. Kristin Lord and
Richard Fontaine for the Center for a New American
Security in December of 2010. It begins by noting that:
. . . as the State Department prepares to implement
recommendations from its first QDDR, its leadership
team must inevitably focus on management. This report, based on extensive interviews with executives
from four major global corporations—GE, McDonald’s Corp, FedEx, and IBM—offers recommendations
for how the State Department can include corporate
management lessons as it grapples with its own efforts
at reform.
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